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
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The cover: A black monkey jump causes consternation in the ranks of the white group. From an Edo period book of illustrations. Reproduced by courtesy of the Nihon Ki-in.

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Go World News



The new Meijin

Kobayashi Takes Meijin Title

Kobayashi Koichi has finally achieved his ambition of taking a top title and he did it by besting his archrival, Cho Chikun. In a dramatic struggle, Kobayashi took a 3-1 lead over Cho in the 10th Meijin title match, but then saw his opponent make one of his patented fighting comebacks to level the series at 3-3. In the final game, however, Kobayashi made no mistake, convincingly outplaying Cho to take the title. This is Kobayashi's fourth open title, but the first time he has won one of the big three. He was so overcome with emotion that he shed tears of joy after the game.

Kobayashi used to be known mainly as an attacking player, but recently he has switched to a strongly territory-oriented style, so he beat Cho at his own game. A major factor in his victory was the decisiveness of his play: in difficult positions he made his mind up very quickly, so he always had plenty of time left for the end-game, in marked contrast to Cho. In several of the games, he played at an extraordinary speed, almost as if he were playing a TV game. Commentators agreed that Kobayashi has reached his peak and that his fast play reflects formidable self-confidence. He has dominated the go scene in the second half of 1985 the way Takemiya did in the first half.

Cho was prevented from extending his record in the Meijin title, but no one else has held it for five years in a row. There is no doubt that he

will be back.

The results:

Game 1 (11, 12 Sept.). Kobayashi (B) won by 5½ points. Game 2 (25, 26 Sept.). Cho (B) won by resignation.

Game 3 (2, 3 Oct.). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (16, 17 Oct.). Kobayashi (W) won by resig.

Game 5 (23, 24 Oct.). Cho (W) won by 2½ points.

Game 6 (6, 7 Nov.). Cho (B) won by 2½ points.

Game 7 (20, 21 Nov.). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Kato Defends Oza Title

Kato Masao may no longer be dominating tournament go, but he is proving to be more durable than most other champions, for he has now won at least one title a year for the last ten years (he's nearly halfway to matching Sakata's record of 21 years in a row as a title-holder). Kato rebuffed Kobayashi Koichi's challenge for the 33rd Oza title by a one-sided 3-0 margin to win this title for the fourth year in a row.

Kobayashi was handicapped by having to play the title match while engaged in his Meijin title match with Cho (he played nine games during October), so it may have been hard for him to produce his best. Apparently he played well in the title match but with no luck. The results:

Game 1 (19 Sept.). Kato (B) won by resig.

Game 2 (9 Oct.). Kato (W) won by ½ point.

Game 3 (31 Oct.). Kato (B) won by 4½ points.

Kobayashi Takes Tengen Title from Ishida

On top of winning the Meijin title, Kobayashi Koichi also beat Cho Chikun in the playoff to decide the challenger for the 11th Tengen title, so he became the challenger for his third title in a row. The final was held on 20 October, sandwiched in-between the fourth and fifth games of the Meijin title, so Cho and Kobayashi played three important games with each other in just over a week. In the title match, Kobayashi overwhelmed Ishida, forcing him to resign in the first (Nov. 16) and third (Dec. 4) games and winning the second by 1½ points (Nov. 29).

10th Kisei Challenger Kobayashi or Kato

Kobayashi Koichi's excellent form in all tournaments is continuing and he has reached the playoff to decide the Kisei challenger. However, his

41st Honinbo League (as of 28 November 1985)

Rank	Name	R	K.K.	K	A	C	S	Y	O	Score
1	Rin	—				0		0		0-2
2	Kobayashi K.		—							
3	Kataoka			—					1	1-0
4	Awaji				—	1		0		1-1
5	Cho	1			0	—				1-1
5	Sugiuchi						—		0	0-1
5	Yamashiro	1			1			—		2-0
5	O Meien			0			1		—	1-1

Note: The players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

opponent is Kato, against whom he did so badly in the Oza title. The first game (26 November) of the best-of-three playoff was won by Kobayashi.

China Wins NEC Super Go

In the final of the NEC Japan-China Super Go team tournament, played in Peking on 20 November, Nie Weiping defeated Fujisawa Shuko by 2½ points to earn victory for China. The playoff between the two captains was a fitting climax to a tournament in which first China and then Japan had looked like walking over the opposing team. Shuko, Kato and Kobayashi had vowed to shave their heads by way of apology to Japanese fans if the Japanese side lost. This may hit Shuko hard, for he recently dyed his grey hair a youthful black.

Ma Wins 1st Japan-China TV Haya-go Ch'ship

In another triumph for China, Ma Xiaochun 9-dan defeated Hashimoto Shoji, current holder of the NHK Cup, in the 1st Japan-China TV Haya-go Championship. This match will be held once a year.

O Meien Wins Places in Both Leagues

O Meien, the 25-year-old 6-dan from Taiwan, has made extraordinary progress since winning the Kido 'new face' prize for 1984 (see GW39, p.2). He has become perhaps the first player to make his debut in both the Honinbo and the Meijin league simultaneously. Participation in one league is considered the mark of a first-class player; participation in both is usually reserved for the go elite. For that reason, getting into both is a great coup for O Meien. Financially, it is worth more than winning one of the minor titles, as he will make a minimum of six million yen in game fees (the Meijin league pays ¥600,000 to the winner of each game and ¥450,000 to the

loser, the Honinbo ¥520,000 and ¥380,000 respectively).

The other two players to get into the 11th Meijin league were Takemiya and Yamashiro (the latter is also in both leagues).

Kusunoki Regains Women's Honinbo

Kusunoki Teruko 7-dan has regained the title she lost to her older sister last year by defeating Honda Sachiko 6-dan 2-1 in the 4th Women's Honinbo Title. The third game was played on 9 October. Kusunoki also won the 7th Women's Kakusei Title (TV haya-go), defeating Ashida Isoko 6-dan of the Kansai Ki-in on 7 September.

Promotions

Promotions in the autumn session of the 1985 rating tournament included:

To 9-dan: Yamashiro Hiroshi, Endo Takahiro (Kansai Ki-in)

To 8-dan: Kataoka Satoshi, O Rissei, Tokimoto Hajime

To 7-dan: Hikosaka Naoto, Fukui Susumu

To 2-dan: Ninomiya Hideko.

Chinese Results

Kung Shangming has become the second woman in the world to reach 8-dan (after Sugiuchi Kazuko). She earned the points for promotion in the autumn session of the Chinese rating tournament.

The Chinese Men's Championship, held in late September and early October, was won by a new face, Fang Tianfeng 5-dan. Second was Ma, 3rd Shao and 4th Liu (Nie missed the tournament because of illness). Jiang Zhujiu, who did so well against Japan, only made 12th place. The Women's Championship was won by Yang Hui 6-dan, followed by Jui Naiwei 6-dan and Kung.

Michael Redmond Reaches 5-dan, Wins 9th Ryuen Cup

Michael Redmond's superb form in the rating tournament is continuing and he has made an important breakthrough by gaining promotion to 5-dan. Michael earned the points necessary for promotion by defeating Kaku Kyushin 5-dan on 2 October. That climaxed an outstanding run in the oteai of 21 games in which he only lost one game and had one jigo (it started with 17 straight wins). The reason why promotion to 5-dan is so important is that game fees for 5-dans are almost double that for 4-dans. 5-dans also start out in the second of the three preliminary divisions of the newspaper tournaments. Incidentally, Michael has made 5-dan in exactly five years, which is a very respectable rate of promotion.

Michael also recently scored his first triumph in a tournament by taking 1st place in the privately sponsored Ryuen Cup. This tournament, founded by the owner of the Ryuen Chinese restaurant, is by invitation only. Every year eight promising young players (mainly 3- and 4-dans) are invited to participate in this knockout tournament. The final, in which Michael defeated Muramatsu 4-dan, was played in front of an audience with commentary by Go Seigen, Otake Hideo, and Rin Kaiho. The tournament has often become a launching pad for a successful career — Michael's predecessors as winner include Kataoka Satoshi and Kobayashi Satoru.

1986 European Go Championship

The 30th European Go Championship and Congress will be held in Budapest at the Eotvos Lorand University (Budapest, XI. Budaorsi ut 95—101) from 19 July to 2 August 1986. For further information, contact:

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European Team Championship

The 1st Open European Go Championship for National Teams was held in Warsaw from 12 to 15 September 1985, with 12 four-man teams from 10 countries participating. The tournament was played over six rounds and was won by Germany, which scored 18 points. The members of the

winning team were Egbert Rittner, Karl Lenz, Stefan Budig, Martin Dieterich, and Herman van Duijkeren. Second was Yugoslavia (15 points) and third Britain (also 15 points but a lower SOS).

British Tournament Results

Northern Go Tournament

Held on 7 & 8 September, this tournament was attended by 36 players. Winner of the Red Rose Shield was Richard Granville 3-dan with 6—0. Equal second were John Smith 3-dan and Eddie Shaw 2-dan on 4—2.

Wanstead Go Tournament

Forty-eight players competed in this tournament, which was held on 28 September. Overall winner was Matthew Macfadyen 6-dan, who beat Terry Stacey in the final round.

Wessex Go Tournament

Held on 27 October, this tournament was won by Jim Barty 4-dan, with 2nd place going to Graeme Parmenter 4-dan of New Zealand.

1985 Australian Championships

The 8th Australian Go Championships were held in Melbourne on 17, 18 August. The top division was won by Dae Hahn 6-dan, who thus took both the open and national titles and became the 1986 WAGC representative. Second was Francis Tung and third Stephen Reye. The kyu division was won by Roger Thompson, with Jan Trevithick second. Jan also won the lightning tournament.

3rd Australia—N.Z. Match

After two 8—8 draws in previous matches, the third Australia — New Zealand match, played on 26—28 August at Hanmer Springs, N.Z. finally produced a winner, with New Zealand taking the honours 10—6. The best individual performance was by Barry Phease of New Zealand, who won all his games.

1985 New Zealand Open Championship

This year's championship, played on 29 August—1 September at Christchurch, was won convincingly by Dae Hahn of Australia with a 5—0 score. Second was Ray Tomes, who scored 4—1 and became the N.Z. representative in the 1986 WAGC. Third was Kyle Jones. Both the championship and the Australia — New Zealand match held before it were attended by Kawamura Masamichi 7-dan of the Nihon Ki-in.

1985 La-Chaux-de-Fonds

Ninety players, including 30 from France, competed in the 6th La-Chaux-de-Fonds International Go Tournament, which was held on 12 & 13 October this year. Yoo Jong-su 6-dan (Korea/Germany) triumphed over a strong field and regained the crown taken from him last year by Andre Moussa (see GW38, page 4). This year Yoo made no mistakes in winning all five of his games. Equal second were Pierre Colmez 5-dan of France and J. Kang 5-dan (Korea/Germany) on 4 points. Following them on 3 points were Jurgen Mattern 6-dan of Germany (4th), Andre Moussa 5-dan of France (5th), and Richard Granville 3-dan of England (6th).

Winner of the second division (1-kyu to 2-dan) was R. Hohenschurz 1-dan of Germany on 5 points. The third division (2- to 4-kyu) was won by Pierre Schauwecker 4-kyu of Switzerland.

Past winners of this tournament are:

1980: Patrice Gosteli; 1981: Jurgen Mattern; 1982, 1983: Yoo; 1984: Moussa.

1985 Hannover Messturnier & German Ch'ship

The highlight of this tournament was the participation of a group of Hiroshima go players visiting Germany. The top two places were taken by Hiroshima players, namely Miyaki Shiun 6-dan, who came 1st with 4:1, and Murai Hiroshi 5-dan, who came 2nd with 3½:1½. Third place was taken by a local player, former European champion Wichard von Alvensleben 5-dan, who scored 3 points.

A total of 170 players competed in the tournament. Twenty of them played in the 1985 German Championship, which was won by David Schoffel 4-dan of Cologne.

1985 Canadian Open Go Championship

This very successful tournament was held on October 12 and 13 in Montreal as part of a government-sponsored Games Fair, which provided for a lot of useful publicity. A total of 66 players, 36 of them dan level, participated in the six-round MacMahon event, which was organized by Steven J.C. Mays, assisted by Paul Dumais. The result in the top division (5- and 6-dan) was a tie between Yoon-Bae Kim 6-dan (Toronto) and Keiji Shimizu 6-dan (Vancouver), each on 5 points, but Kim was declared the Canadian Open Champion on SOS. The next day a playoff was held between these two players to decide the Canadian WAGC representative next year and this was won by Kim.



*Yoo takes revenge on Moussa.
(Photo by Schweizer Pub.)*

British Schools' Team Championship

The 6th British Schools' Team Championship was held on 10 March 1985 at Furze Platt Comprehensive School in Maidenhead. Eight schools participated and the winner was the Furze Platt 'A' team, which won all its games to finish with a 12-0 total (over four matches). Members of the winning team were Simon Carter, Leigh Rutland, and Benedict Prynne. Second was Woodroffe (Lyme Regis) and third the Furze Platt 'D' team. The event was organized by France Ellul, who founded the Furze Platt go club, and sponsored by Equity & Law PLC of High Wycombe.

1985 British Youth Championships

The 2nd British Youth Championships were held at the Furze Platt Comprehensive School on 7 July this year. Results of the different sections were:

Under-18: Sam Perlo-Freeman (Woodroffe)

Under-16: Nicola Oswald (Furze Platt)

Under-14: Jason Cobbold (Culceth H.S.)

Beginners' section: Angela Mills (Furze Platt).

This tournament was also sponsored by Equity & Law PLC.

1985 Swiss Championship

This tournament, played on 3, 4 November, was won for the fourth year in a row and the fifth time overall by Patrice Gosteli 3-dan. Second place was taken by Hans-Peter Baumann 3-dan of Basle, who becomes the 1986 WAGC representative. A half-point loss cost Serge Fontaine 1-dan of Geneva second place.

China v. Korea in California

Nie Weiping v. Cho Hun-hyun
by Jimmy Cha 4-dan

In March of this year two of the best professional players in China, Nie Weiping 9-dan and Liu Xiaoguang 8-dan, arrived in California for a three-week stay in America. As far as I know, this was the first tour ever undertaken in the United States by professionals from mainland China. It was a project that I have been working on for more than two years and was only made possible by the enthusiastic support of the Chinese Go Club of Los Angeles.

Arranging the sponsorship for the tour was easy: a piece of cake! But the political questions made the matter very complicated. I visited Korea twice in the course of a year just to straighten out those problems. The Dong-A Newspaper agreed to pay the expenses for Cho Hun-hyun and Kim In, the two top players in Korea, as well as for Nie and Liu, but only if they were assured publication rights to both the story and the game scores that would result from encounters between the Chinese and Korean players. Until the very last minute I wasn't sure how it would all work out.

The biggest problem was that the government of mainland China was not as cooperative about the matter as I had hoped. I tried a couple of years ago to make contact with the Chinese players on my own. I had read about them and I wanted to see for myself how strong they really were. But I got no answers to my inquiries. It was here that the Chinese Go Club in Los Angeles proved so helpful. They conveyed my proposals to the appropriate people in China and arranged many details of the trip. Finally, after months of negotiations, the Chinese arrived, to be followed a few days later by the Korean players.

I have known both Cho Hun-hyun and Kim In for many years and I have written about them in past issues of *Go World*, but this was the first time I had met the Chinese players. Before I present the two games that Nie and Cho played together I would like to give you my impressions of Nie Weiping.

I was sitting in the Korean Go Club in Los Angeles watching Nie play simultaneous games when someone asked me what I thought of his play. 'He is strong,' I said. 'Look at the way he holds and plays his stones: delicately but with confidence and a feeling of inner strength. Not many players have that skill.' I was not watching what particular moves he was playing. I was watching the man himself. With strong players that is enough.

Nie complained that he spends much of his time these days promoting go in China and doesn't have as much time for study. But despite this, you can see from the following games that he has a fine natural talent for go.

Both Nie and Liu, as well as the Chinese guide/interpreter who accompanied them, were pleasant people and we all had an enjoyable time together. I hope to renew my acquaintance with them when I visit China this fall and perhaps I will have more to write about in another article.

Game One

White: Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan

Black: Nie Weiping 9-dan

Played on 31 March 1985 in Los Angeles.

Figure 1 (1 - 24)

Both this game and the next were played informally, as exhibition games, so there were no strict time limits. However, neither player took very much time over any one move, so the games were over in less than an hour.

The moves to White 16 are all ordinary, but Black 17 is unusual. I think he should play the




Figure 1 (1 - 24)

usual move at 'a'. Black gets a forcing move at 19 and can look forward to another one at 'b' in the future, but his eye shape with this group is not good and White can aim at exploiting that in various ways.




Figure 2 (25 - 55)
47: connects (at 38)

Figure 2 (25 - 55)


White 26 is placed exactly right. If he plays 1 in Dia. 1 and answers Black 2 by extending to 3, Black aims to force once with 4 and then to build power in the center with 6. Cho apparently disliked that prospect.

White 1 in Dia. 2 is also no good. Black plays the checking extension of 2 and then scoops out White's territory with 4.


Suh Bong-soo 8-dan commented on this game in *Paduk* and criticized Black 27 as too heavy. Black should jump lightly to 'a', perhaps forcing first with Black 28.

White 28 is another move that occupies just the right spot. Then with White 30 and 32 Cho exhibits his preoccupation with the center. Evidently he felt that the game would be decided by whoever predominated in that area. White 32 at 39 would make shape and, what's more, aim at the aji around an attachment at 'b', but Cho prefers to emphasize the center.


So evidently did Suh Bong-soo, who recommended that White answer Black 33 by attacking in the center with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3. Should Black answer with 2 at 3, White would play a two-step hane at 'a'. This is indeed the kind of fast-and-furious attack that Suh favors.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4


Black dodged White 34 by jumping into the center with 35, but White makes quite a bit of profit with 36; his lower left-hand corner now rivals Black's lower side in terms of territory. Apparently Black disliked the low posture he is forced into in Dia. 4, where White can aim at exploiting Black's lack of eye shape by playing at 'a'.

Taking sente, Black attacks at 37, but White has a wonderful answer with 38. Of course, he mustn't allow Black to cut through his position as in Dia. 5. White 1 in Dia. 6 is not much better. Black forces with 2 and 4, stabilizing his group.


Black 39 in response is an overplay: he tricks himself! Black should play 1 in Dia. 7. White will reinforce his group with 2 through 6 and Black



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

can secure his base with 7. Not only that, Black still holds sente, since White is forced to answer Black 7 here with White 'c' in the figure. Anyway, it is obvious that White has gotten the better of the situation here when he slides under at 46.

Black 51 is a thin move. Perhaps he should have played at 'd' instead. Black has to reinforce this area immediately with 53, but that does not take care of the thinness of his position completely. However, now White must not neglect the checking extension of 54.

Figure 3 (56 – 100)

Black pursues another mistaken course with 61 through 67; he simply helps White to build thickness in the center. Instead he should follow Dia. 8, capturing White's triangled stones on a large scale. This would lead to a level game. (It may seem that Black's area is very large, but White's attachment at 'a' reduces Black's territory in sente and White can also play various forcing moves from the outside.)

Black gave up sente to stake a base on the left side with 69 and 71, but that gave White a chance to take advantage of Black's thinness on the up-






Figure 3 (56 – 100)




Dia. 8




Dia. 9

per right by attacking the corner with 72 through 76.

What do you think of Black 77? After the game I suggested to Cho that Black had a better play here, that is, Black 1 in Dia. 9. It seems that White has little choice but to play 2 and 4, but then Black cuts with 5. After White 6 through Black 11 a ko results, but this is a one-sided burden for White: a flower-viewing ko. Black has plenty of ko threats around 99 in the figure and



Dia. 10



Dia. 11


9: above 7

on top of that, look how thick he gets here! He is sure to get as many points here as he eventually realized in the game.


Black 79 is forced. Of course, Black could kill the white group with 2 and 4 in Dia. 10, but White would atari at 5 and chop into Black's territory with 7 and 9. This is terrible for Black.

And again with 81 Black must be circumspect as to how he plays here because of his thinness. If he tries to kill White with 1 etc. in Dia. 11, White turns the tables on him through 18.

The result here more or less settled the issue, though Black chose to play on for another hundred moves or so.



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

leaves himself with the large endgame point on the lower side.

The reason Black cannot attack White's center group strongly is, again, his thinness on the upper side. Black 41 is forced. If he neglects to play here White 1 through 5 in Dia. 12 send him reeling.

Trying to save everything (and kill White in the process) with 1 through 5 in Dia. 13 leaves Black himself dead after White 6.




Figure 4 (101 – 150)

Figure 4 (100 – 150)

Black continued to attack with 5 through 15, but White was at no point in any real danger. He skips out of range with White 16 and then answers Black 17 with the brilliant tesuji of 18. Here you can see Cho Hun-hyun's genius at work. With the artful sequence of plays from 22 through 30 White connects his group and at the same time




Figure 5 (151 – 208)

103, 106: ko; 108: connects (at 100)

Figure 5 (151 – 208)

The game ended with White winning a ko on the right, but Black had already reconciled himself to the loss some time before. He was simply timing his resignation.

Black resigns after White 208.

Game Two

White: Nie Weiping

Black: Cho Hun-hyun

Played on 6 April 1985 in San Francisco.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 11 in answer to White's peep at 10 initiates a sharp contemporary variation. The moves up to White 28 are forced and now the question is which is worth more, White's territory or Black's thickness.

Black 31 is unusual. This is played one point above 35 for the most part.

Perhaps Black should answer White 42 at 47. With White 46 through 50 Black comes under attack.






Figure 2 (51 - 100)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (50 - 100)


Black trudges out into the open with 55 through 65, which is bad enough, but Black 69 is an out-and-out blunder. At the very least Black should live in sente with 1 through 7 in Dia. 1. He would also keep in reserve the sequence Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.

Next, Black 77 is a slack move: it is not yet necessary. White brings Black under attack with 78 and once again Black plays a bad sequence of moves with 79 through 89.

But to backtrack a bit, as soon as White plays 76 Black should probe the corner at 1 in Dia. 2, which is the vital point. How can White answer this? If he plays 2 through 4 Black has a simple answer at 5. With 7 through 11 the corner becomes ko. Dia. 3 shows a related variation. Actually, Black should simply leave the situation as it is after Black 9 in Dia. 3 and switch to 78 in the figure. He would be more than happy to see White add a move here while he takes a more valuable point out in the open.

Now you can understand what a mistake it was to blithely force White to live in the corner with Black 81 and 83. Black eliminates any potential he had in this corner while ensuring that he himself must give up sente for a small life on the side of the board with Black 89.

Black 91 is also a slack move: it is too slow. Black should take the opportunity to seize the initiative with 1 in Dia. 4. White scurries to live



Dia. 4

with 2 through 6 and Black can turn to the next big point.

With White 98 Nie shows his own brilliant touch. Perhaps Black overlooked this move. He counterattacks with 101 in the next figure, leading to the exchange through Black 105. This exchange is roughly equal for both.




Figure 3 (101 - 165)

Figure 3 (101 - 165)

White 10 is a mistake. This is too small. If White had played at 31 he would have had an easy win.

But Black doesn't follow up his attack at 13 correctly. In particular, exchanging Black 21 for White 22 is a mistake, since Black strengthens White while making his own position below thin. He should have simply played at 23. (White blundered in turn by playing 32, which helped Black to reinforce his shape here, but. . .)

White 34 is an overplay, but Black misses his chance to take advantage of it. He should answer White 34 with a nobi at 36. If White plays 35

Black hanes at 46 and White is in dire straits. Nie said that he was prepared to answer that move (35 at 36) by attaching at 'a' in the figure, but then Black plays 35. If then White 'b', Black kills White's center group with a move at 49.

As you can see, White secured life for himself in sente with his plays through 50 and then turned to the biggest endgame point at 54. Now the game is very close.

Black 55 is small. He should have cut at 56.




Figure 4 (166 - 232)

115: takes (right of 72); 132: connects (below 76)

Figure 4 (166 - 232)

After all of Black's blunders and slack moves it is amazing that he is still in the game but as a matter of fact it is only in this figure that he throws the win away for good.

That final mistake is Black 83. If you are playing this game out on a board, stop right here and try to figure out why this is the losing move and what Black should have played instead.

It is really quite a simple matter of counting. Black 83 is worth 4 points. If Black had pushed once at 84, forcing White 88, he would have gained 1 point. Next Black 96 is worth 6½ points. (When Black captures at 104, White must answer at 'a'. The ko capture is worth ½ point. 100, 101, 102, 103, 105 and 'a' are worth 6 points. Total= 6½ points.) The net difference between the sequence given above and that which actually occurred in the game is 3½ points. Had Black followed the course suggested there is no way he could have lost.

Continued on page 33.

A Champion for All Seasons

Takagawa Kaku
by Bob Terry

In March 1984 an era seemed to come to an end when not only the legendary Go Seigen announced his retirement, but Takagawa Kaku, who is just as much a legend in his own right, announced that he too was retiring. *Go World* chronicled the life and career of Go Seigen in issues 35 and 36, so it is only fitting that we accord Takagawa the same treatment.

A great deal of the following article comes directly out of the mouth of Takagawa Shukaku (the name he chose for himself when he assumed the title of Honinbo and which he still enjoys by virtue of the fact that his nine consecutive titles entitle him to be called 'Honorary Honinbo'). Some of the article is taken from pieces he has written himself, some from pieces written about him, and some from the string of interviews he has given for various publications over the years. We have woven the material together and edited it for the sake of continuity.

Takagawa Speaks About His Youth

I was around six years old when I learned go. My father played at the amateur shodan level and almost every day he would invite his neighborhood go cronies over to play. I wandered in and out of the room and before I knew it I had learned how to play. The first game in my life was with my father at nine stones; we played twice and I won both times. 'Kaku is a go genius, a genius,' my father exclaimed and spread the story all over the town.

My father was originally a miner and when he was young he roamed far and wide throughout Japan. In his early forties he settled in Tanabe City, Wakayama Prefecture, where I was born on 21 September 1915. Anyway, my father had saved up a little money and from then on he never had a real job. Every day was spent playing go or dabbling in calligraphy and antiques and curios. His talk was high-flown, as big as a whale, and so he was known about the neighborhood as the 'foxy old hustler'. (Ironically Takagawa was given a similar nickname much later in life, but there was no connection-B.T.) With this kind of 'foxy old hustler' making his extravagant claims about me to one and all, it wasn't long before my name was known throughout the town. Thus it was that the strongest player in the area, an elementary school principal, undertook to give me some lessons.

I was not a genius by any means, but if a youngster of seven or eight is instructed by someone with good technique he is bound to improve quickly. That in turn sparked the desire in my father to make me a professional player. He was




a doting father and I was the last child, so it was perhaps natural for him to dream that one of his offspring at least would get professional training.


In 1925, at the age of 11, I went to Tokyo. Through the good graces of a distant relative I stayed at the home of a prominent businessman. Since I was so young, my older sister accompanied me.

The Nihon Ki-in was located in the Ginza district at that time. Very shortly after I arrived in Tokyo I played a five-stone game against Maeda Nobuaki 1-dan and another game at nine stones against Shusai Meijin.

The nine-stone game against the Meijin was published in the magazine *Ranka*. Dia. 1 shows the opening. The Meijin criticized the duffer's moves of Black 10 and 12 as being 'uncultivated, showing poor technique.' (This is reasonable since I had



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

just arrived from the countryside and I still didn't really understand the game.) However, at the end of the game, in answer to White 1 and the following in Dia. 2, I answered correctly through Black 14, killing the group, and now I was praised by the Meijin: 'He played well, without making a slip.' Because of this game I was regarded as a player of promise and allowed to study at the Ki-in. The Meijin added: 'If he can play at this level at his age he certainly has a future. If he is entrusted to my care I can guarantee that he will reach 5-dan by the age of 20.'

But I only stayed in Tokyo for two months. Family problems necessitated my return to the west, to Osaka, where I became a student of Mitsu-hara Itaro Sensei. In 1928 I was recognized as 1-dan and two years later I became a full-fledged

Takagawa's career

Born on 21 September 1915 in Tanabe City, Wakayama prefecture. Became a disciple of Mitsu-hara Itaro, Hon. 8-dan, in 1925. Made shodan in 1928.

1931: 2-dan 1936: 4-dan 1941: 6-dan

1935: 3-dan 1939: 5-dan 1945: 7-dan

1952: defeated Hashimoto Utao 4-1 in 7th Honinbo title, took the name of Shukaku.

1953: 8th Honinbo - defeated Kitani Minoru 4-2.

1954: 9th Honinbo - defeated Sugiuchi Masao 4-2. Won 2nd Oza title (defeating Miyashita 2-1). Won 1st Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship. Promoted to 8-dan.

1955: 10th Honinbo - defeated Shimamura Toshihiro 4-0. Lost 2nd Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship to Sakata 0-2.

1956: 11th Honinbo - defeated Shimamura 4-2. Lost a jubango with Go Seigen 4-6.

1957: 12th Honinbo - defeated Fujisawa Hosai 4-2.

1958: 13th Honinbo - defeated Sugiuchi 4-2.

1959: 14th Honinbo - defeated Kitani 4-2. Lost 6th Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship to Sakata 0-2.

1960: 15th Honinbo - defeated Fujisawa Shuko 4-2. Lost 4th Igo Ch'ship to Shimamura 1-2. Lost 7th Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship to Sakata 0-2. Promoted to 9-dan.

1961: 16th Honinbo - lost to Sakata Eio 1-4. Lost 9th Oza title to Sakata 1-2. Won 5th Igo Ch'ship, defeating Miyashita 1-0 (+2 jigos). Lost 2nd Nihon Ki-in No. 1 Position title to Sakata 1-2.

1962: Defeated Sakata 3-0 in 9th Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship. Lost 3rd Nihon Ki-in No. 1 Position title to Sakata 0-2.

1963: 18th Honinbo - lost to Sakata 2-4. Defeated Yamabe 3-1 in 10th Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship.

1964: 19th Honinbo - lost to Sakata 0-4. Lost 1st Pro Best Ten to Sakata 0-2. Lost 11th Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship 0-3 to Sakata.

1965: Lost 2nd Pro Best Ten to Fujisawa Shuko 1-2.

1966: Lost 5th Judan title to Sakata 1-3. Won 13th NHK Cup. Lost 3rd Pro Best Ten to Rin 0-2.

1967: Won 11th Igo Ch'ship. Lost 4th Pro Best Ten to Sakata 0-2.

1968: 7th (Yomiuri) Meijin - defeated Rin 4-1. Awarded the 6th Shusai Prize.

1969: 8th Meijin - lost to Rin 2-4.

1973: Instruction tour of Europe.

1974: Toured China, scored 4-1-2 jigos.

1979: Complete games published in 8 volumes.

1984: Retired on 8 March.

member of the Sensei's dojo, staying at his home. In 1931 I was promoted to 2-dan.

I failed the entrance examination for the Osaka College of Commerce and so it was, almost at the last moment, that I embarked on a professional go career. That was in 1933. I was seventeen and I joined the Oteai tournament of the Nihon Ki-in.

War and Peace

In 1944 I beat Go Seigen in the Oteai and earned my qualification for 7-dan. Unfortunately I also received my draft notice at the same time; for a while it seemed that I would not be able to complete my Oteai playing schedule and would thus forfeit my promotion. However, an exception was made in my case and I was recognized as 7-dan. (I received the diploma in January 1945.)

From around 1943 my country began treading a perilous path. For my own part, the next few years through the postwar period were difficult. I suffered as did everyone. I went through the same experiences.

My classification was a low one but in the final days of the war the army took anything they could get. At a farewell party I stood up and I said, 'For my country's sake I am to be a sacrifice stone.' This might sound like an affected way of speaking, but I assure you that is not how I was feeling.

After a training period I was sent to serve at an Osaka military hospital. However, after two months I was released from service, completely worn out. From the viewpoint of one serving on the front line, this was not much of a military service, but my frail constitution just could not take it.

Tokyo in the midst of war was a bleak sight. Provisions were disappearing rapidly and the rain of bombs and firebombs from the sky was awful. Somehow the Oteai continued, but on May 25 the Nihon Ki-in was burned to the ground in a night raid.

Then I was drafted again. I was dispatched to Miyazaki Prefecture with a platoon of 200 men in order to build a field hospital. It was backbreaking labor and all there was to eat was wheat meal and radishes. I broke down from malnourishment with a rash all over my body. At the hospital the doctor said, 'You've got syphilis, son,' and gave me an injection. . .

The whole platoon listened to the broadcast that announced the end of the war. The static was

so bad we could not make out anything. . . but we knew the war was lost. For my part I was aware that my body couldn't last and the war couldn't last; if that was the case, the sooner it was over the better. 'Thank God, I'm saved,' I thought to myself.

I was 27 and I returned to Wakayama. For the next few years it was a struggle to live. I had to sell my possessions and my clothes in order to buy food. I tried growing a garden but with little luck. I also tried my luck at the black market. I'd open out a blanket on the ground and spread out my wares, bundles of dried squid or shoes, whatever. But when some young punk came by and asked, 'Hey, buddy, did you pay for this spot?' I stammered out the name of some local hoodlum I'd heard of and walked away. I didn't go back.

Takagawa Honinbo

Everyone suffered like this after the war. But in 1950 things became better for me. I moved my family to my present home in Tokyo. After eight years of marriage we finally settled into a real home. My two eldest children were very happy.

This was a turbulent period in the go world. The Kansai Ki-in was founded by Hashimoto Utaro in September 1950, and he took the Honinbo title with him. There was a rule that no one other than a professional associated with the Nihon Ki-in could hold the Honinbo title. One faction wanted to strip Hashimoto of the title while another argued that it would be best to regain it over the board. Finally it was decided to win the title back.

I participated in the 5th and 6th Honinbo leagues, but I dropped out both times with a poor record. In the sixth league, Sakata, Kitani and Hasegawa tied with a 5-3 record and Sakata went on to win the play-off. At the time he was a rising star of the Nihon Ki-in and was considered the best and strongest candidate for defeating Hashimoto.

I was the official observer at the first game and the commentator for the fourth. After leading by a score of three wins to one loss, I didn't think it possible for Sakata to be upset, but Hashimoto displayed greater vigor. Sakata pressed him hard but was finally defeated by the clock.

I fought my way into the 7th Honinbo league in 1952. It turned out to be quite a battle among us, with Kitani, Sakata, Miyashita, Tainaka and




Figure 1 (1 – 60)

7th Honinbo league playoff (23, 24 April 1952)

White: Sakata; Black: Takagawa

myself all finishing with the same 4–2 score.

During the play-off everyone except Sakata and myself was eliminated. Figures 1 to 3 show the deciding game between us for the right to challenge Hashimoto.

It was played in a room at the Nihon Ki-in in Takanawa. From the start Sakata used up a lot of time and was soon in time trouble. In those days if a player went to the toilet during byo-yomi the opponent was not permitted to play before he returned. During this game Sakata went to the toilet many, many times. It was quite amazing.

When the game was over I found that I had become challenger. On my way home a reporter interviewed me.

‘What a go fiend!’ I said. ‘The way Sakata keeps at it is remarkable. Compared to that I’m a frail soul indeed.’ And I added, ‘I think that from the point of view of recapturing the title for the Ki-in, Sakata would have been best. . . It’s a heavy responsibility for me. . . I just hope that I don’t get bowled over with four straight losses.’

It was two months to the start of the match. On one side I heard ‘The Honinbo title *must* be recaptured’ and on the other ‘With Takagawa’s level of skill he’ll be lucky to take one game.’ To tell the truth I was more than a little afraid that would indeed happen. I was uneasy with the sense of responsibility and also a lack of self-confidence. In order to steel my resolve I came to the follow-




Figure 2 (61 – 120)




Figure 3 (121 – 193)

25: ko; 27: connects; 64, 67, 70, 85: ko

White resigns after 193.

ing conclusion: ‘I won’t think about the Nihon Ki-in or the Kansai Ki-in. I won’t think about the title even. I will concentrate on giving my all on the board and not worry what anyone else says.’

That helped me calm myself and so did a letter of encouragement from one of the principals of my old high school: ‘The Honinbo title is not something that one should strive to fight for and win. If one is qualified, heaven will bestow it in the natural course of events.’

The match started at the end of June. My mother prayed every morning at the family shrine and my wife would stop at the village shrine on




Figure 1 (1 – 50) 44, 47, 50: ko
7th Honinbo Title, Game 3 (23, 24 July 1952)
White: Hashimoto; Black: Takagawa




Figure 3 (151 – 160)
50, 55, 58: ko




Figure 2 (51 – 100)
81: connects (at 68')

her way home from shopping to offer incense.

I lost the first game by a stupid mistake though I had played well. I didn't get any sleep the night before the game or on the night after the first day's play either. On top of that, I hardly ate a bite those two days. The next game I made sure I had some sleeping pills.

I won the second game and also the third, which is shown in Figures 1 to 4 (Ishida Yoshio analyses the joseki in the lower left corner on page 38, Vol. 3 of the *Dictionary of Basic Joseki*). With this win I breathed easier and went all out in the




Figure 4 (161 – 223)

Ko: 64, 67, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82, 85; 91: at 69;
ko: 92, 109, 112, 115, 122. White resigns.

fourth game to produce a fine game with White.

With my win in the fifth game the title was mine. 'So this is what it is like to be Honinbo,' I thought and everything seemed strange as I gazed around the room. And when someone addressed me as 'Honinbo' I felt like a bride of three days suddenly referred to as 'the lady of the house'. That night I didn't feel happy, just physically and psychologically exhausted. I had fulfilled my duty. But when I returned home and snuggled deep into bed to go to sleep, I felt a warm glow of happiness well up from the pit of my stomach.

Nine Straight Titles and Eleven Straight Defeats

A big party was held in my honor in Hakone. However, I couldn't simply rest on my laurels. In October a three-game match with Go Seigen was slated to begin.

Unfortunately I lost all three games. This was a pattern that was to repeat itself. After a successful title defence I would play a three-game match with Go Seigen and lose all the games. It was only years later, after I had lost 11 games in a row, that I finally won one.

At this time Go was clearly stronger than I. His level of play was beyond me. I remember blurting out to a reporter that 'in a game with komi Go is three points stronger than I.' It was years before I narrowed that to only one and then finally none.

I did manage to win the Honinbo title nine times, including the next match with Kitani in 1953, which ended in a 4-2 score.

1954 was the best year of my career. I was 39 years old and coming into my prime.

First, in January I advanced to the final of the NHK Cup but lost by half a point to Shimamura. Then in May I defeated Shinohara to take the 1st Nihon Ki-in Championship. Next I met Sugiuchi in the Honinbo match. Of all the nine titles, this was the most difficult battle for me. It was sheer luck that I prevailed by a 4-2 score.

Up to the fifth game we had each won with Black and from the standpoint of wins and content we were evenly matched. Here is the fifth game, which proved to be the turning point of the match.

This was an easy game for me. I built up a big territory on the lower side and if I could just save my group on the right everything would turn out fine. I played Black 95 after long thought, but it was a meaningless move, an awful blunder. Instead, attaching with a jump to 107 would have saved the group. Realizing my mistake



Kitani playing Takagawa in the Honinbo title.

I lost all hope and for several moves I toyed with




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

9th Honinbo Title, Game 5 (5, 6 July 1954)

White: Sugiuchi; Black: Takagawa




Figure 2 (51 – 100)




Figure 3 (101 – 157)

the idea of resigning. But Sugiuchi's play at White 100 revived my spirits. White also missed chances after this and I had succeeded in crawling back up from the depths.

After my title defence and annual three-game loss to Go Seigen came another highlight of the year. In October I was promoted to 8-dan in the Oteai. I had spent ten years as a 7-dan; that is a long time. To round out the year I defeated Miyashita two to one to take the second annual Oza title.

I defeated Shimamura in four straight games in 1955 and four to two in 1956 to defend my Honinbo title.

From July 1955 to November 1956 I also

played a Jubango with Go Seigen, the last of his career. At the start I lost a good game with White and after that two more. Suddenly my back was against the wall. I nursed myself through the crisis by winning with Black in game four but lost game five and again I was faced with the kadoban. In the sixth I escaped by the skin of my teeth but then I lost the seventh game. It was a desperate situation because I couldn't win with White. Finally I lost the eighth game by one point with Black and was beaten down a rank. I won the ninth and tenth games with Black, so the score ended up four wins to six losses, but I had been beaten down, that was a fact. I simply couldn't cope with Go's strength.

I'm often asked who is the strongest player of all time, Go at his peak or Sakata at his. I am one in a position to know because I tested the question with my own skin. Go's strength seemed divinely inspired while Sakata exemplified the heights to which a human being can aspire. For my part I would list Go first and then Sakata, but if someone should list Sakata first and then Go I couldn't really object. The truth is I really do not know myself. Amateurs love lists, but it is like asking which is stronger, a lion or a tiger.

In 1957 I defeated Fujisawa Hosai four to two in the Honinbo match but every game was like skating on thin ice. It was dubbed the 'upset series' and in fact five games were won by White. That always seems to happen when I play Fujisawa.

Fujisawa resembles Kitani in that if he cannot decide the best thing to do in a situation he simply cannot bring himself to play. When he must choose between two reasonable continuations, he will knock himself out trying to decide between them. He seems to want to force the issue through sheer will power. Because of that he uses a great deal of time and quickly gets into time trouble. That can be dangerous.

I try to postpone the decision of the game until the latter half and so I conserve my time. In the early going I don't waver between which line is best, this one, or is it this one? I choose at once. It is simply playing the averages.

And to begin with I don't have a well developed intuition. I envy those who do, like Sakata and Otake. Accordingly, time trouble is a frightening thing to me.

I was upset in the fifth game. Fujisawa also played the sixth game well. My opening was bad but I crawled back into the game and it became




Figure 1 (1 – 65)

12th Honinbo Title, Game 3 (22, 23 July 1957)
White: Fujisawa Hosai; Black: Takagawa

This is the most violent game of the series with Hosai. He begins with his favorite mimic-go (mane-go) strategy. Black 21 stops that, so then he plunges into the black moyo. This was another favorite strategy of his: to let the opponent set up a moyo, then to destroy it from the inside. This game, however, shows one of his failures. Note, however, that the life-and-death struggle only becomes so massive in scale because White rejects chances to live on a small scale (for example, with 62 in Figure 1 at 64). Hosai is known for never compromising.




Figure 2 (66 – 110)

75: three spaces to the right of 66; 92: connects.





Figure 3 (111 – 171)

Ko: 32, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, 58, 61, 64, 67, 70.

White could again live by playing 106 in Figure 2 at 109 (Black 'a', White 'b' follow), but he can't win if he gives up the group on the side. He goes for all or nothing with 12 in Figure 3, but Black can't lose after he plays 13. White resigns after Black 171.

Continued from page 18



close. As usual Fujisawa was in time trouble, a minute per move. At the end it came down to something like the situation in the diagram. Since the surrounding position has no bearing here, I have simplified the matter. When Black hane at 1 I blocked at White 2. Should Black connect or play ko? This one or is it this one? It was a half-point game and the ramifications of the ko were quite complex. When Fujisawa heard the timekeeper say 'Fifty-eight seconds' he straightened up, grunted and then cut at Black 3. That decided my win. If Black had connected at 'a' and if White had connected at 3, Fujisawa would have won by half a point.

One other thing. After the sixth and deciding game I dragged myself into my bed at the sponsoring inn and fell into a sound sleep. I woke up

at eight or nine the next morning and heard a strange clicking sound. I rang for the maid and asked her what the noise was. I was told that Fujisawa had gone to bed with a board and had stayed up all night analysing the game. Amazing. You don't find many players like that these days.

In 1958 I beat Sugiuchi four to two in the match for Honinbo and Kitani the next year by the same score. In 1959 I was finally able to beat Go Seigen three straight games in our customary match.

The second game of the series is given below.




Figure 1 (1 – 65)

White: Go Seigen; Black: Takagawa
Played on 9, 10 January 1959




Figure 2 (66 – 130)

Ko: 75, 78, 81, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99, 102.
104: connects.




Figure 3 (131 – 200)

86: connects





Figure 4 (201 – 244)


31: connects (above 9)

Playing Black I sacrificed one group of stones after another. Finally, after the fourth group, I managed to surround a large territory. The result was a half-point victory for Black. This is a rather famous game, as I'm sure you know, because of the problem that emerged in the ending.

Dia. 1 shows the problem. There is nowhere left to play. In White's center territory there is a ko left with Black 'a' through 'g'. Go insisted that since Black hasn't enough ko material with which to fight it, White is not obliged to defend against the threat, and so White saves a point.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 2 simplifies the problem. If the ko material favors White, should he be obliged to capture at 'a'? From the past this has perplexed many and caused many disputes. According to the rules of the Nihon Ki-in, White is required to add a move here.

However, Go pointed out that he was not a member of the Nihon Ki-in, was never informed of the enactment of those rules nor was he consulted regarding them. He further insisted that he did not recognize any right the Nihon Ki-in might claim to regulate these three-game matches. Certainly there was a good deal of validity in his claims.

Of course, I myself maintained that White was obliged to add a move here.

If White is required to add a move, Black wins by half a point; if he is not, White wins by a half point. Therefore, the result of the game is at stake and I remember a two-hour argument ensued. However, it was all very civilized, no one lost his temper.

In the end Hasegawa Akira, the official observer, adjudicated a black half-point win.

The next day Go met with a representative of the Nihon Ki-in and the sponsoring Mainichi newspaper and agreed to a compromise: he would drop

his objections if the Ki-in would revise the rules.


Because of this incident a committee to revise the rules of go was formed. (After more than a quarter of a century, the rules have yet to be reformed. — B.T.) This was quite a memorable game for me.

Takagawa the Teacher

Eleven days after the game with Go Seigen, Takagawa played the game below with Sakata in the second annual Strongest Player tournament. Sakata won this tournament, but Takagawa had the distinction of handing him his only loss.

However, there is another reason for presenting this game and that is to showcase one more of Takagawa's talents, that of a clearheaded and gifted teacher. Takagawa is justly famous for his works on the opening, but the following article illustrates his ability to present graphically those elements that make up positional judgment.

(B.T.)




(1 - 68) 60: connects

White: Sakata; Black: Takagawa

My theme here is how to determine just how many points any given amount of thickness is worth. Thickness will at some point be converted into territory, at the very latest in the endgame. What I want to examine with you is the point at which the conversion into territory is made.

White lives on the upper side with 68, which produces the situation in Dia. 1 (next page). Let's analyse the situation.

White's territory: lower right corner= 5 points, upper side= 8 points, right side= around 7 points (the 'x' points: this cannot be considered so much



Dia. 1

as 10 points), upper left = 12 points (taking into consideration the difference between a black invasion at 'a' and a defensive move by White), lower side = 3 points (White 'b' through Black 'e'). White has a total of 35–36 points.


Black's territory: lower right = 10 points, lower left = 12–13 points (the difference between Black 'f' and White 'g'), lower side = 2 points (around the point of 'h'), upper right corner = 5 points (the difference between Black and White 'i'). Black has a total of approximately 30 points.

White has 5 points more territory, but it is Black to move. If that move is considered to be worth 5 points, then Black maintains the balance. There was no komi in this game.


The above is a simplified appraisal of the position — it neglects to take into consideration two important points. The first is the fact that the white group in the lower right corner (5 points) is not unconditionally alive. The other is that the value of Black's thickness on the upper side has not been factored into the calculations. The second point is especially important; if this is considered then it can be said that Black leads in the game at the point of Dia. 1. In other words, White's territory equals 35–36 points, Black's equals 30 points *plus* the upper side thickness *plus* the move.

Well then, how much is the upper side thickness (around the point of 'A' in Dia. 2) worth? That is the question. One's first impression is that it is unreasonable to expect 10 points; 5 points would be closer to the mark. But can we confirm that impression?

First let's follow the actual course of the



Dia. 2 (1 – 25)



Dia. 3

game in Dia. 2. Black invaded at 1 and White answered through 8. Sakata pointed out after the game that instead of White 4 he should have played as in Dia. 3. That is true, but be that as it may Black invaded at 9 in Dia. 2 and the moves to White 24 followed inevitably. Since Black is thick on the upper side, White cannot resist strongly there. Blocking at 19 with White 10 is unreasonable, and White also has no choice about defending his position with 24.

I wonder if you have realized already the following points.

1. Black's thickness on the upper side around 'A' has disappeared.

2. Black has profited on the right side.

Black's thickness has been cancelled out by the thickness White developed through 24. Secondly,

Black has profited on the right side. In other words, Black's thickness around 'A' has been converted into profit on the right side. Let's examine this more closely.


Up to Black 23, Black's territory has grown by 15–16 points. Since he started out with 10 points in the lower right corner Black has profited by 5 or 6 points. White's territory has been cut to the 3 'x' points. Since he had 7 points here before, White has lost 4 points. Add this to Black's gain of 5–6 points and we can conclude that Black has profited by around 10 points here.

The conclusion is that Black's thickness on the upper side had a value of 10 points; a surprisingly large value. However, we have left another factor out of consideration.

Since White has become thick with 22 and 24 in Dia. 2, it is not as threatening for Black to turn at 'a'. Also, Black's group jumping into the center from the lower side has been slightly weakened. Then too, there is now a strong possibility that White's triangled stone cannot be captured.

Taking into consideration all of these factors, it can be seen that the 10-point value for Black's thickness cannot be accepted unconditionally. A number somewhat lower than 10 has emerged. The conclusion is that Black's upper-side thickness was worth less than 10 points but somewhat more than 5.


Dias. 4 and 5 show the further course of the game. Black used his thickness to take control of the board slowly but steadily and with Black 19 in Dia. 5 the outcome was decided.



Dia. 4 (1 – 21)

From Honinbo To Judan To Meijin

The fifteenth annual Honinbo match in 1960



Dia. 5 (1 – 19)

gave me my ninth straight (and last) Honinbo title.


Fujisawa Shuko was the challenger. I was 44 years old and still in my prime, but Fujisawa was 10 years younger and was just coming into his own. He had won the Top Position title and was among the strongest of my potential opponents. His strength, both then and now, consists of a marvelous intuition and indomitable self-confidence.

I remember an incident that occurred when Fujisawa and Sakata were contesting the Top Position title. After the game they were examining a position and disagreed as to its evaluation. Neither would budge from his opinion. For myself, I'm the kind of person who, when I've heard a strong player's opinion, will nod to myself and think, 'Well now, that is indeed one way of looking at it, isn't it?' and partially abandon my own evaluation. But these two could not bring themselves to do that.

The discussion became heated and Sakata became more and more vehement, but Fujisawa, while refusing to abandon his opinion, was calm and collected. Finally he said, 'Okay then, let's go at it and see who is right!' I was a bit amused listening to their exchange, but I can testify that Fujisawa did not say this in jest. Of course, this was like waving a red flag in front of Sakata. Be that as it may, such is Fujisawa's confidence in his skill.

I won the Honinbo match by a 4–2 score.

The first game was played at the Ise shrine. I had the upper hand in the middle game, but I missed the finishing blow. Rather than attacking a group in earnest, I thought I could win on



Dia. 1

Ko: 11, 14, 17

points and I wound up miscalculating.

But what amazed me was the speed with which Fujisawa played, rapid-fire. The game was over unusually early, by two o'clock in the afternoon on the second day.

A reporter had gone out for coffee and when he returned the game was over. He had heard my position was better, so he naturally assumed that it was I who had won the game. As we returned to our hotel in the car, he turned to Fujisawa and said, 'Don't lose hope, young man. There's still a long way to go in the match.' Fujisawa managed an embarrassed smile while I grinned broadly.


I played hard to win the second game but was roundly defeated in the third. That brought us to the fourth game, the one of the infamous non-existent ko threat.

Dia. 1 shows the controversial position. I staked the game on White 1; there was little choice about it since the game was lost if White did nothing. A ko inevitably followed, but with 16, Fujisawa responded to White 15, a move that was not a ko threat.

Had Black connected at 1 in Dia. 2 the game would have been over. White's cut at 2 leads to nothing.

Fujisawa took no time to connect at 16 and then suddenly he gasped, 'Takagawa, that wasn't a threat!'

'Really?' I had also overlooked that fact. I am often accused by fans of being a wily old fox who deliberately played a bad move to confuse my opponent and score an upset, but that is hardly



Dia. 2

the case. I would have to be some kind of wizard to do that.

I lost my Honinbo title the next year to Sakata by the score of 4-1, but I believe that I fought well. I lost two games by a half point and one by a point and a half. But the game of go tests the complete range of one's strength, one cannot complain of bad luck. Sakata clearly bested me.

I tottered up out of my seat after the final game and all of a sudden there was a thunderous ovation. The assembled fans were applauding the new Honinbo.

I contested many games after this with Sakata, but I only beat him in one title match, the 9th annual Nihon Ki-in Championship in 1961. (Takagawa and Sakata have played more games against each other than any other rivals in Japanese tournament history: 97. Sakata leads the series by the lopsided score of 74 wins to 21 losses, 1 jigo and 1 game's result is unclear-Ed.) I lost two more Honinbo matches and two Pro Best Ten matches, among others, to Sakata.

I was voted number two by the fans for the Pro Best Ten tournament (Sakata was number one) four years in a row. And in the final, I lost four years in a row, twice to Sakata and once apiece to Rin Kaiho and Fujisawa Shuko.

I remember one year at the opening ceremony preceding the Pro Best Ten tournament, Sakata stood up and addressed the audience: 'I thank everyone for your kindness in voting me the number one position. This year too, I will set my sights on first place and do my best to attain it.'

Then I spoke: 'I thank everyone for your kindness in voting me the number two position. This year too, I will set my sights on second place and do my best to attain it.'

The audience exploded in laughter, but ironically it was fated that that year both Sakata's

and my own (?) desires were fulfilled exactly as we predicted.

In 1965 I defeated Fujisawa Hosai 3–1 to take the Judan title. The final game is given below and just one glance is enough to get the feeling of Fujisawa's peculiar style of play. The go writer Ezaki Seichi had this to say: 'I was watching the progress of this game and suddenly I felt as if I were looking at one of Picasso's pictures. Professionals will say that the opening here is one for the books, but it looks as if a pair of amateur 10-kyu players could have produced it, just as it seems that a child has painted some of Picasso's works.'

White 20 aims at attaching at 'a', but it was a questionable move. He should have exchanged White 22 for Black 23 and then defended at 21. Also, exchanging White 24 for Black 25 was a mistake, since now 'b' becomes a powerful move for Black. Simply playing White 24 at 'c' was best.

It is typical for Fujisawa to tempt his opponents to invade his territory with an eye towards their destruction, but here the plan didn't come off. With 93 in Figure 3 Black is free and clear, so Fujisawa resigned.

In 1968 I challenged Rin Kaiho for the 7th Meijin title. The previous year my score in the Meijin league was 6–2, allowing Sakata to qualify as challenger, but this year I was alone at 7–1.

I wanted to try my luck at least once in a match for Meijin. The long series of Meijin matches between Sakata and Rin was coming to an end and




Figure 1 (1 – 27)

14th Judan Title, Game 4 (7 December 1965)
White: Fujisawa Hosai; Black: Takagawa




Figure 2 (28 – 60)

48: connects




Figure 2 (61 – 93)

White resigns after 93.

I wanted to test for myself how strong Rin was. Up to that point we had split twelve games, six wins apiece.

I won this match 4–1. Looking back over the whole series I cannot help being impressed with the fighting strength Rin was able to bring to it. He would never say die, standing firm, standing fast, persisting to the bitter end. So it is with a great deal of pride that I remember this match. After the deciding game Go Seigen said: 'The rock-solid Rin has been defeated by the immovable Takagawa!'

The first two games were one-sided affairs, with Rin matching my spirited win in the first game




Figure 1 (1 – 65)

7th Meijin Title, Game 3 (9, 10 September 1968)

White: Rin Kaiho; Black: Takagawa




Figure 2 (66 – 130)

126: ko

with his own in the second.

Game Three, which is given above, was drawn out, as were the last two games of the series. I had to fight and grapple and outlast Rin in a contest of willpower. We both used every bit of time we had, and the game ended at one o'clock in the morning of the third day.

I won this Meijin match but lost the return match with Rin the next year.

After the third game that year I led 2–1, but during the fourth game I caught a cold before the start of the second day's play. I have a weak con-




Figure 3 (131 – 200)

91: connects (left of 61)




Figure 4 (201 – 266)

Black wins by 3 points (komi 5 points).

stitution to begin with and a cold lingers on for a month or so. I suffered an upset defeat in that fourth game and could not muster any physical, psychological or analytical strength for the fifth and sixth games either. I resigned both games with plenty of time on the clock.

Then too, in order to capture the Meijin title at the age of 53 I had to give everything; it was the distillation of my strength. During the return match the taut string just snapped.

Now it has come time for me to retire, something I have been thinking about for quite a while. My strength is failing, for the last ten years I have



Sakata finally takes the Honinbo title away from Takagawa but not before the latter had set a record that may never be beaten – nine years in a row as Honinbo. (Watching, far left, is Iwamoto Kaoru.)

just not been able to draw upon any reserve energy. The games I produce are filled with blunders and so it is like the waning days of a champion sumo wrestler; when he begins to lose he has no choice but to resign. There is only the question of timing. So too for a long, long time I have pondered when the right occasion would be. But I also had another consideration in mind and I hope that you do not take it as an excuse. When

I was young I produced immature games and likewise I thought it appropriate to leave behind some games of mine as an old man.

As the years have gone by I have changed my style, reading less deeply in order to conserve my strength and playing intuitively. But that too is no longer adequate and since I cannot compete effectively on the professional level, from now on I will simply enjoy go as an amateur.

Takagawa's Artistry with Thickness

by Ishida Yoshio

When enumerating those go players who favor playing for thickness in their games, the one who comes immediately to mind is Takagawa. The fact that this is so indicates just how representative he is of the 'thickness faction', but, truth be told, Takagawa has a unique way of utilizing thickness.

As one side builds up thickness, the other side is sprinting ahead as regards territory, and one

must always keep a sharp eye on the thin points in the opponent's position in order to mount an effective attack on those weaknesses left and so gain the upper hand. This essentially is the rationale behind creating thickness. But the strange thing is Takagawa not only does *not* seek to actively utilize thickness to attack his adversary, he seems to *avoid* a fight. However, this is emphati-

cally not the case of a weaker player running from battle. When the opponent picks a fight and the sparks begin to fly, one must energetically beat the attack back. . . and secure a victory in the scuffle. Without that knack it is doubtful one could be Honinbo nine consecutive times. But from Takagawa's standpoint the choice is clear: if the fight demands a compromise (and his chances will not suffer as a result), he would rather choose that course than come to blows.

The ultimate result is that Takagawa's thickness envelops his opponent, neutralizing his strength and safely steering the game into the yose. In the meantime a paradox occurs: the thin and weak side attacks the thick side.


Takagawa's thickness spreads out and gradually takes control of the board; and finally, when the yose comes, that indirect pressure aggressively asserts its presence and assumes control. As might be expected, the focal point is the center more often than not.

One can calculate the value of the territory on the edges of the board comparatively early in the game, but the true value of the center is not so readily apparent. It is just there that one's judgment concerning thickness is tested and so often found wanting. One who never dreamed that there was profit to be made in the center is stunned. But by the time he has realized what has happened it is too late. It is just that skill that Takagawa honed to a science and used so many times to secure victory.

An Aversion to Moyos

Let's take a look at one or two examples of Takagawa's fuseki technique and how he guides the game into a leisurely pace.

White 1 in Dia. 1 is the famous Takagawa 'boshi' (capping play). For Black to jump to 1 here would be a good move, but it cannot be considered essential. The opening set-up with White extending to 'a' and Black jumping to 1 would be a commonplace fuseki. However, it is certainly true that if White plays 'a' Black can develop a moyo with 1. A scrappy fighter would think nothing of allowing his opponent to build a moyo. Kitani Sensei is one example among many, but one must have the confidence to plunge right into the adversary's sphere and stake the game on the success or failure of the invasion. For Takagawa there is an unconscionable risk involved here, even if the risk is but one in a million of his coming to grief. Therefore, he neither seeks to create a



Dia. 1


Takagawa (White) v. Sakata

moyo of his own, nor does he like to see his opponent create one. That is the thought process that gives rise to the boshi of White 1. Closely related to this is the fact that while White 1, 3 and 5 limit Black's moyo, at the same time they are placed in such a way as to operate most effectively towards the center, another hallmark of Takagawa's style.

White 1 in Dia. 2 is a boshi of a singular sort, but the unique Takagawa style is evident here too. If White does nothing here, Black may get to jump to 'a'; should he further be allowed to extend to 'b', Black's moyo would be inviolable.


When the matter is put this way one is tempted to nod in agreement, but there is a serious problem here; to wit, very few players are able to imitate such a style.

Players oriented towards making profit (and that means the majority) could not play this way



Dia. 2

Takagawa (W) v. Sakata



Dia. 3


since they would be loathe to help Black fortify his position. Rather than cede a large-scale territory, the usual thing would be for White to wedge into the position with 1 in Dia. 3. This will lead to a fight with Black 2 to White 5, and the question is whether one welcomes this fight. Takagawa does not.

Just what is the reasoning that supports the Takagawa style of ceding territory in advance to the opponent. . . yet confident all the same of one's chances in the game?

Assured Positional Judgment


It is nothing other than absolute confidence in one's positional judgment. At the very least it is quite a feat to be able to win without fighting. If one does not fight and thereby goes down in ignominious defeat one is roundly chastised: 'What on earth are you doing?' But should one attempt to imitate the Takagawa style, that would be the likely result.

The moves from Black 1 to 11 in Dia. 4 are from another game with Sakata. How would you



Dia. 4

Takagawa (B) v. Sakata




Dia. 5

evaluate the result?

When Black boxes White in with 3, it seems that White's stone is in a pinch, but with the brilliant tesuji of 6 and 8 White manages to connect underneath. Not only that, White ends up with sente. Wouldn't you agree that White has played exquisitely here? Well, regarding this result Takagawa's opinion was that 'Black is satisfied'.

Dia. 5 represents my own tewari analysis of the sequence of moves (an equal number of stones have been removed for both Black and White from Dia. 4). One may consider that Black's set-up here has been disrupted, leading to Dia. 4. Black's territory has been reduced by about 10 points but he has recouped half of that with the addition of the stone at 'a'. The conclusion is that Black has not given up all that much territory and has managed to build powerful thickness in the center. Therefore, even though he ends in



Dia. 6

Takagawa (B) v. Rin

gote, Black is certainly not badly off, so I must support Takagawa's opinion.

Takagawa's outstanding positional judgment has been discussed, but it is not merely confined to the go board. To make a comparison with a marathon runner, Takagawa in his best games calculated just how the fatigue factor was affecting his opponent and paced himself for the final spurt that gave him the win.

Finally, Dia. 6 shows a playing style completely at variance with the Takagawa image. This is the first game from the series when he captured the Meijin title from Rin. With 1 to 11 Black spins around the board like a tornado. After the game Takagawa related that he had considered cutting White in the upper right with Black 'a' to 'g'; instead he demonstrated a powerful fighting style.

('Kido', February 1983. Translated by Bob Terry.)



How Many Moves Ahead Is It Possible to Read?

by Takagawa Shukaku, Honorary Honinbo

The Play of Gods. . .

Just how many moves ahead is it possible to read?

One would imagine that the gods of go are able to read out completely any possible continuation in the game of go. Suppose two such gods were to contest a game. The god holding Black might slap a stone down on a star point or perhaps a 3-4 point. At that point the god playing White would presumably lapse into thought with his arms folded and after a short while declare, 'No. There's no chance,' tendering his resignation. I daresay the god holding White could read out his five-point loss (?) or six-point loss (?) on the board down to the last endgame play.

On the other hand, a human being's intellectual capacity depends upon the grey matter that can be packed into a pumpkin-like skull and that yields an I.Q. in the range of only one hundred or so. One cannot expect that one's go I.Q. can be separated from one's fundamental mental capacity.


Thirty Moves at a Glance

Some time in the past Sakata Eio stated that he could read 'thirty moves at a glance'. Ishida Yoshio said something similar a few years ago. What they are indicating here is that in a comparatively difficult position they are able to read in a flash thirty moves deep. Well, perhaps

it is a bit of an exaggeration to claim to read out those thirty moves precisely, but for players of the first rank that probably is more or less an accurate figure. While pondering that, consider the boast of a certain amateur who claims to be able to read out fifty moves at a glance. The trick, according to him, is to be able to determine immediately whether a ladder works or not. If one is able to tell instantly whether one can capture a group in a ladder if the opponent tries to run it out, one can claim to read fifty moves at a glance. But this is just foolishness.

From time to time people ask me questions of the same sort: how much I can read in a situation. Since I am not the type of player who is able to read deeply at a glance, I usually reply something like, 'Well, if I have enough time I can read pretty accurately.' Invariably the person who has asked me the question listens to this with a look of annoyance mixed with disappointment on his face. That is because he expected some astounding number. Surely it is obvious that if one has time one can read out situations! And what is so terrific about being able to read 'pretty accurately'?

'Except, with unlimited time I can read out fifty thousand moves, perhaps a hundred thousand moves,' I offer and my questioner brightens up a bit.



Dia. 1


A Little Exaggeration

In every age there is a tendency to deify a master who is outstanding in his field of endeavor. The masses yearn for this and rejoice when it happens and the master himself, towering over his contemporaries, has little reason to make objections.

Dia. 1 shows a game played in 1802 between Senchi (Chitoku) and Jowa (the complete game may be found in Chapter 5 of *Appreciating Famous Games*). Jowa, playing Black, won by two points, but the game is more famous for White's masterful play. So much so that it is considered the masterpiece of Chitoku's career. Sekiyama Sendaiyu, who may be regarded as the amateur Meijin of the time, wrote: 'Jowa's Black 1 (move 101) is the blow that may be viewed as the play that sealed the win. Senchi, who was immediately frozen upon seeing this move, determined that a win was in no way possible yet he wished to cut the loss by even one point if he could and pondered various schemes toward that end. However, the upshot was that the game was fated to end with a two-point difference.'

The idea here is that Black 1 established the win but that White, while realizing that a two-point loss was in the cards, racked his brains to find a way to reduce the loss to one point. But such a resource was not to be had and the game ended as each player had read out, in a two-point loss.

What kind of exaggeration is this? Yet in so saying is one not guilty of *lèse-majesté*? Sendaiyu must have felt that with such an impressive story the rank and file would have gasped in delight.



Dia. 2

Perhaps this might have motivated him to spread this tale.


Concerning this evaluation of Sendaiyu's, Honinbo Shuho chose to dismiss the matter completely by dubbing it 'asinine' and Meijin Honinbo Shusai also considered it 'absolutely impossible'. But again, think: since these players are of the first rank, isn't there a possibility, be it even one percent, that this may be true? One tucks away the whole matter in one's memory. Be that as it may, Jowa assumes mythical proportions and is viewed in such a light from then on. . .

Reading It Out to The End

Moving from the world of gods we descend to the human sphere. To be specific, let us touch upon one of my own games.

Dia. 2 is from the fifth game of the 11th annual Honinbo Title (1956). Black is Shimamura and I am playing White. In answer to White's marked stone, Black pressed with 1. Black is pushing things to the limit with this; the usual response is for Black to draw back at 2. The game continued with the moves through Black 9 and after forcing once with 10, White played 'a'. With 'a' through 'd' White grabbed a stone. This makes the game very close. One expects a half-point white win, but it depends on a very careful reading of the whole board and a cogent evaluation of one's chances. However, in the actual game Black blundered, handing White the win.

The general opinion was that even if Black had drawn back to 1 in Dia. 3 (next page), White would have won by a half point. The fact is, Black 1 initiates a painful exchange: White 'a' for Black




Dia. 3

'b'. That sets the boundaries of the half-point game.

I was still in my thirties at that time and when the occasion arose I would read out the endgame to the very end. It usually took about an hour. Of course, this game cannot be compared with the complexity of the Jowa-Senchi game we have previously considered; the board situation is much more settled.

Let's take the White 'a' —Black 'b' exchange for granted. The point 'c' is worth seven points gote and 'd' (as opposed to Black jumping in once) is worth a little more than six. Therefore, these points are practically miai. One does not read such plays at this point: one has read them previously. The hane at 'e' is Black's right; 'f' is White's, since Black must respond at 'g' to live. White 'h' is ostensibly sente, but there is a more than even chance that Black will get to make his own hane and connection at the same point. Both White 'i' and White 'j' are large points. So consider: how will it all come out after White 'j', Black 'k'? The lower central area is particularly difficult to evaluate, since both sides have the points at 'l', 'm' and 'n' to aim at. This is the only area where one would have trouble calculating the territorial division.

Dia. 4 shows what might happen if Black draws back to 1. The sequence to Black 97 produces a half-point win for White. But I did not read this out thinking that if Black draws back this is what will happen. I have simply taken isolated positions that I read out during the game and put them together to create this diagram. However, even without reading out such a comprehensive se-



Dia. 4 (1 - 97)

quence of moves to Black 97 it is possible to determine that White has a half-point win here.


Obviously the question revolves around the multitude of situations embedded in the variations to Black 97 in Dia. 4. Unless we evaluate these situations one by one there is no way to determine absolutely what will happen.

I. White might jump one point to 'a' with 6. If so, Black 18 guarantees a real thirteen-point profit. Since the lower center is still open, the white jump to 'a' is much smaller than one might expect. If Black turns to 19 with 7, White will gain ground by expanding with 9.

II. On the other hand, using White 6 to hane and connect at the point of 13 is supportable. This might also be considered as a solid half-point win for White.

III. Next consider if Black extends at 'a' with 9; White will press at 27. Black 7 and 9 reduce White's territory in sente.

IV. Black 19 is worth 5 points, reverse yose. However, White 20 cannot be regarded as inferior to Black 19 in point value. See Dia. 5, where Black 1 forces White to capture a stone with 2. The con-




Dia. 5

tinuation brings about a reduction in White's territory. Again, if White should leave things as they are, one can anticipate the exchange of Black 4 for White 11, which will leave White thin around the point of 'a'.

V. Playing Black 25 here is correct; peeping at 57 will be followed by White 55 and Black 26. Rather than surrender sente it is best for Black to build up his position with 27 and 29.

VI. If White does not play 30, Black grabs two stones by pushing through at 36.

VII. At 35, Black might also play 1 in Dia. 6. The kosumi-attachment of Black 5 is big, but in exchange, White stakes claim to an area of his own with 6 and 8. If one posits the sequence from 'a' to 'd', the difference is four points but at the expense of accepting gote. Dia. 4 and Dia. 6 are roughly equivalent.



Dia. 6

Outside of these points there are various other questions that have to be examined in depth. However, this would without doubt entail reading out hundreds of moves.

Time Limits v. Reading

When I was young and playing matches or league games I would occasionally at the end of the middle game make such assessments. This kind of reading differs from that involved in tesuji or semeai situations; the endgame somehow demands elements of intuition and guessing. Plus, one must factor in the overall evaluation of the position. One may feel that the game is won but is it a half-point win or a point and half? One's reading confirms one's initial impression. Yet even when

my impression was off, the result rarely differed by more than a point.

Reading out variations to the end such as Dia. 4 is an exercise in futility despite what one might believe to the contrary; in an actual game one does not need to go so far. Reading out a situation so intensively, step by step, inch by inch, will merely confirm the fact that White's win is a point and a half rather than a half point with somewhat greater accuracy.

As I said before, I am not the type of player who can read very deeply at a glance. So it was always important for me to ration my time. In a tournament game the timekeeper would use a sheet of paper to record the time taken over each move. One sheet was used for each hundred moves. It was divided into four sections. I would allocate an hour to myself for each of those sections containing 25 black and white moves. Therefore, my schedule would give me eight hours to complete two hundred moves. After two hundred moves the game is winding down to the small points of the endgame, so an hour would suffice. That makes nine hours. The hour left over I would save for the difficult fighting of the middle-game. In such a way I would regulate the ten hours at my disposal. Usually everything went well, but at those times when one difficult situation on the board led to another, my time schedule would become more and more disordered.

For a dullard like myself, whose reading ability is directly proportional to my time allowance, it is imperative to utilize my time effectively. Genius types may perhaps ignore such considerations and still play without this kind of pressure.

(Translated by Bob Terry.)

More on Takagawa in our next issue:

"Improvement: Random Notes" — an essay by Takagawa.

'The Complete Games of Takagawa' (retail price \$500) is available at a special discount. Write to the Ishi Press for details.

Continued from Page 11

Despite some incredible blunders and lapses of judgment by Cho Hun-hyun, this was a very interesting game. Along with the earlier contest in Los Angeles, both players took back to the Orient vivid memories of their encounter in America.

White wins by 2½ points.

23rd Judan Title

23rd Judan Tournament

Winners' Section											
O Meien	}	Otake	}	Hane	}	Hane	}	Hane	}		
Otake											
Sakata	}	Hane	}		}	Hane	}	Hane	}		
Hane											
Kajiwara	}	Kajiwara	}	Kobayashi	}	Kobayashi	}	Kobayashi	}		
Hashimoto S.											
Kobayashi S.	}	Kobayashi	}		}		}	Rin	}		
Kojima											
Kada	}	Ishida	}	Ishida	}	Ishida	}	Rin	}		
Ishida Y.											
Iwata	}	Kato	}	Kato	}	Kato	}	Rin	}		
Kato											
Koyama	}	Rin	}	Rin	}	Rin	}	Rin	}		
Rin											
Sugiuchi	}	Cho	}	Cho	}	Cho	}	Cho	}		
Cho											

Losers' Section									
O Meien	}	O	}	O	}	O	}	O	}
Sakata									
Hashimoto	}	Kojima	}	Kojima	}	Kojima	}	Kojima	}
Kojima									
Kada	}	Iwata	}	Iwata	}	Iwata	}	Iwata	}
Iwata									
Koyama	}	Sugiuchi	}	Sugiuchi	}	Sugiuchi	}	Sugiuchi	}
Sugiuchi									
	}	Otake	}	Otake	}	Otake	}	Otake	}
	}	Kajiwara	}	Kajiwara	}	Kajiwara	}	Kajiwara	}
	}	Kato	}	Cho	}	Cho	}	Cho	}
	}	Kobayashi	}	Ishida	}	Ishida	}	Ishida	}

This year's Judan title match between Kobayashi Koichi and Otake Hideo was expected to be a tough tussle, but it turned out to be a triumph for Kobayashi. He has been enjoying his best form ever for the last year or so, as indicated by his results from April 1984: winning the Judan from Kato, winning the 9-dan section, the second stage, then reaching the playoff in the 9th Kisei, tying for 1st place in the 9th Meijin league, defending the Judan title against Otake, tying for 1st in this year's Honinbo league, winning the Meijin league, becoming the Oza challenger. This is a record anyone could be proud of.

In particular, his one-sided win against Otake in the Judan title match was impressive, since his senior Kitani disciple seemed to be in excellent form, as the roll-call of players he defeated (see chart) would indicate. Obviously, Kobayashi was in even better form.

Of particular interest in the Judan tournament

this year was the superb performance of O Meien 6-dan. O, who turns 24 in November, is the oldest of the three O brothers. He has been doing very well in the last year or so and has emerged as a rival to his fellow Taiwanese, O Rissei (no relation).

Before we go on to the title match, we would like to present the playoff between the winners' and losers' sections of the Judan. It is a spectacular rough-and-tumble fight of the kind not usually associated with the names of either Rin or Otake.

Judan Playoff

White: Rin Kaiho, Honinbo

Black: Otake Hideo, Gosei

Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

Played on 14 February 1985.




Figure 1 (1 – 36)

Figure 1 (1 – 36)

White 34 was probably intended as a forcing move, but when Otake did not answer as expected at 'a', pride demanded that Rin pull out his stones with 36.

Figure 2 (37 – 72)

By the time he finally extricated himself with 54, Rin was probably regretting his decision. One does not often see a professional play so many moves on the second line. Otake was ahead.

But Rin got back into the game with the brilliant move of 72. Otake was unable to read out




Figure 2 (37 – 72)




Figure 4 (101 – 150)




Figure 3 (73 – 100)




Figure 5 (151 – 205)

the result of fighting a semeai with the white group on the side, so he decided to move out.
Figure 3 (73 – 100)

In this figure Rin got his second wind. By the time he squeezed up to 96, he had caught up.

Figure 4 (101 – 150)

Rin went on the attack with 2, but 4 was an overplay. White 'a' would have been better. Otake's counterattack with 11 gave Black the initiative again.

White 30. White would like to jump to 39 but is afraid of Black 'b'.

Figure 5 (151 – 205)

Black 71. Perhaps the game-winning move. White has too few ko threats, so he is unable to

resist — that is, if White 74 at 'a', Black 'b'. Had White known that 71 was coming, he could have avoided trouble by playing 70 at 'a' (sacrificing 66 and 68).

White 96. White decides to go out fighting. He should answer 95, but that would leave him ten points behind on the board.

Black 105 kills the group: if White 'c', then Black 'd', White 'e', Black 'f'.

Shuko often asserts that 'go is fighting'. This game bears him out.

White resigns after Black 205.

Otake thus secured the right to challenge for the Judan, a title he had held in 1969 (8th Judan)

and 1980 and 1981 (18th and 19th). This title match was his first with Kobayashi. The latter has commented that when he was a teenager Otake was one of his targets.

Game One

White: Kobayashi Koichi 10-dan

Black: Otake Hideo, Gosei

Played on 6 March 1985 in Hamamatsu City.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi.





Figure 1 (1 – 32)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1 – 32). Otake's tenuki strategy

Black 9. A tenuki strategy Otake uses occasionally. If Black follows the standard joseki with Black 11, White 25, Black 'a', then White 'b', threatening to invade at 'c', becomes a very good extension. After 11, Black hopes for White 25, Black 'a'. This would be an ideal result for Black, as White 10 would be in the wrong place. That is why White counters with the pincer at 12.

Black 13. Attaching at 26 would lead to immediate fighting when White pushes up and cuts. White 12 would then prove useful, so Black plays peacefully.

White 20 is the turning point of the fuseki. White could also exchange 'd' for Black 'e'. Kobayashi: 'I was taken aback by the severity of Black 21. White now has no choice but to start a fight with 22 and 24.'

White 26. A change in plans. Kobayashi originally intended to play 1 in Dia. 1, but he realized that after 2 to 6 he had no effective attack on the black stones at the bottom left (13, 15, 25). The aim of 26 was to turn the 15–16 exchange into a bad one for Black (without it, descending at 29 is a good move), but Kobayashi was surprised when Otake connected at 29. He had expected Black 1 in Dia. 2, which lets White make centre thickness with 2 and 4. With 'a' in reserve, White's corner is under no pressure. Note that without a stone at 'a', Black cannot play 1 at 3, as White counters at 1. When Black plays 29 regardless, it turns out that White has no good follow-up.

White 30. Correct shape is 'f', but then Black easily settles his group by attaching at 'g'. White has to maintain pressure on Black to stop him from attacking the corner with a placement at 'h'.





Figure 2 (33 – 71)


Figure 2 (33 – 71). A mistake in timing

Black 37. Otake regretted not first exchanging 1 for 2 in Dia. 3 (the reason soon becomes apparent). After 6, Black could link up with 7 (the presence of the marked black stone means that White can't hane at 'a').


What if Black plays 37 at 40? Dia. 4 shows the wrong answer for White: Black kills him with the




Dia. 3




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 7



Dia. 6

brilliant tesuji of 7. The correct answer is 2 and 4 in Dia. 5. If Black 5, White will win the semeai after 6.

White 42. Since Black no longer has the threat of the placement at 40, there is no need for White to answer 41 immediately. Black can't permit White 43, but a comparison of the result to 44 with Dia. 3 shows how badly Black has done: he has fallen almost a move behind. Otake: 'What terrible timing! I felt disgusted with myself. I completely lost the will to fight on.' The game is now good for White: he has an eyeless group to chase.

Black 45. Black could capture two stones with 'a', but White 45 would be big.

White 54 is good shape. White 'b' is sente, so Black cannot attack at 'c'.

White 56. Not at 'd': Black would attach at 56, weakening the centre white group.

White 58. A good move, in this case. If at 62, Black will be happy to make a pincer at 69.


White 62. If at 1 in Dia. 6, the group will come

under attack with 2 to 6.

Black 65. Black can't permit White 65 after 62 and 64.

White 66. The only move. If at 69, Black plays at 'e' and continues the attack. White 69 would be heavy.

Black 67. Kobayashi recommended following Dia. 7 instead. He thinks that Otake may not have realized that White would play a ko with 68 and 70. Usually in this kind of position White squeezes with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8.



Dia. 8





Figure 3 (72 - 100)

Ko: 77, 80, 83, 94



Dia. 9

Figure 3 (72 - 100). Skilful ko sabaki

Black 83. Black can't connect at 100 as he doesn't want White to push at 'a'.

White 86 etc. White must play this sequence now. If he takes the ko immediately with 1 in

Dia. 9, Black will build thickness with 2 and 4.

Black 95. Finding a ko threat is difficult. This is a good, solid move, but White ignores it. In the result to 100, White has used the ko very skilfully to get sabaki (i.e. settle his group).




Figure 4 (101 - 140)

Figure 4 (101 - 140). Attack in the centre

Black 19. Otake regretted this move. As will be seen later, White was able to make a severe attack on his group. Instead, he should have made shape by jumping to 36. That move would have enabled him to answer 26 at 28.

Black 29, forestalling White 'a', is big. It also aims at the cut at 'b'. Instead of passively defending, White launches an attack on the centre group with 30. Black secures one eye with 31 and can get a second eye at any time with 'c', but he fights to avoid the indignity of being reduced to minimum eye space.

Figure 5 (141 - 180). A loss either way

White 44. A tesuji: Black doesn't get an eye with 45 and 47.

Black 57. Black is behind in territory, so he defies White to capture the centre group. That is not so easy, so White also goes for territory with 62. If instead he tries to kill the group with 74, Black plays the carefully timed sequence to 15 in Dia. 10, then counterattacks with 17. If White 'a', then White is the one in trouble after Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

When Black takes a second large endgame point with 69, White runs out of patience. Even after 74, however, there is a way for Black to live.






Figure 5 (141 - 180)



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

If Black 1 in Dia. 11, White cannot kill him. If 2, the continuation to 10 is forced (assuming White keeps trying to kill Black); if next White 'a', White loses after Black 'b' to 'h'. However, if White just avoids all complications by playing 2 at 'e', he maintains a slight lead.

Black resigns after White 180.

(*'Kido'*, May 1985)

Game Two

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played at Hakone on 20 March 1985.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio, Tengen




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 24. A variation that has appeared in a number of games this year. White 40 is a new move — the usual move has been 'a'. White 40 makes it harder for the three black stones to move out, the reason being that Black has no leverage against White. Without 40, Black 40 is sente.

Black 41. Sacrificing the stones is the correct decision, especially in view of the fact that White answers docilely at 42. Better would be White 49 — that would make it harder for Black to make up his mind what to do with his three stones while also denying him the peep at 49 (with its good follow-up at 'b').

Figure 2 (51 - 80)

White 54. A little slack — better to reduce the moyo with 'a'. That aims at so many invasion points in the top right ('b' to 'e', for example), not to mention the attack at 'f' on the left, that it would be hard for Black to find a suitable answer. Kobayashi had expected 'a' and was not happy about the prospect.

Black 55 is not just a territorial move. If White omits 56, Black will play at 62 next and aim at pulling out his three stones.

White 70. The move most regretted by Otake







Figure 2 (51 - 80)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

in this game. He said that he should first have attached at 1 in Dia. 1. If Black 2, White can then play 3. This way he keeps the black groups separated. Black 2 in Dia. 2 is worse for Black, as White builds thickness in sente.

White 74 is also bad: Black is delighted to be able to link up with such good shape with 75. White should play the clamp (hasamitsuke) at 1 in Dia. 3; if Black 2, White can split Black with 3 to 7; if next Black 8, White 9 threatens 'a' next.

White 76. White can't hope to compete in surrounding territory, so he has to reduce Black's moyo.




Figure 3 (81 - 120)

Figure 3 (81 - 120)

Black 85. Worth 20 points, though it doesn't look it, according to Ishida. If White captures this stone, Black's moyo becomes very thin. For example, White can aim at 'a'.

White 92. 'An insane move' (Otake). It is indeed the losing move. White had to connect at 101; if next Black 118, White plays 111, forcing Black 110, then attaches at 'b'. This way the game would still be wide open.

Black 93 is a good answer to 92. White has to continue with 96 to 100 to make sense of 92, but then Black pushes through with 101 and 103. White, of course, can't resist with 104 at 105 as Black cuts at 104. Black 105 then decides the game — or should have.

White 106, preparing to resign, is a meaningless move. If Black answers with 1 to 5 in Dia. 4, he can then switch to 107 and the game would be over.


Black 107. Kobayashi: 'I was blinded by the lure of 35 points.' Capturing the white group may be worth 35 points, but the exchange to 116 favours White when you consider how it weakens the black group to the left. Otake must have been very surprised; he had played 106 instead of making eyes with 109 because he was hopelessly behind, but instead of having to resign he was suddenly very much in the game.

Black 109. Another chance to follow Dia. 4.

Black 117. Black now has to scramble to make eye shape.

Figure 4 (121 - 160)

White 26. Helping White to play this move is



Dia. 4

Dia. 5




Figure 4 (121 - 160)

one of the by-products of Black's mistake with 107.

Black 29. To defend against White 47.

Black 33. Better to connect at 34; if then White 'a', Black ignores it and connects at 40.

Black 37. Necessary to stop White from getting the approach-move ko in Dia. 5.

White 40. The game is now dead even.

Black 45 is the winning move, which means that White had to play there with 44. White 45 would be sente, so White could then come back to 44. Later, when Black attaches at 59, White would then be able to hane in at 'b', which makes a difference of three points. Poor Otake, who must have been counting on White 45 as his privilege, became disgusted with himself when he saw Black 45.

Black 59. Kobayashi was probably confident of victory when he played this move.

Figure 5 (161 - 212)

Perhaps the most painful thing about this loss for Otake was that he didn't get a good opportunity to resign. His mistake came late in the game, when the shape had mainly been decided,




Figure 5 (161 – 212)

and moreover it was not a dramatic one. Amateurs will play on into the small endgame points, count up and then resign, but professionals like to set the scene properly by making one last dramatic gesture (launching a hopeless invasion, for instance, or not defending a group under attack). In this case, Otake found himself with little choice but to play the game out.

Black wins by 4½ points.

(‘Kido’, May 1985)

Game Three

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Otake Hideo

Played on 4 April 1985 in Matsuyama City.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi.

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Kobayashi: ‘The pincer at 10 sets up the extension to 16, which reduces the value of the right side when Black extends to ‘a’. If White has




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

a stone at 16, Black’s potential expansion of the upper right corner is limited.’

White 28. Jumping to 29 is more usual, but White doesn’t want Black to attack at ‘b’. This is a difficult move to answer. If White ‘c’, Black builds a nice position with ‘d’.


Black 29. Black ‘a’ would be a good move, but the urge to punish the tenuki with 29 is understandable.

Black 35. If at ‘e’, White makes good shape with 36. The cut is reasonable, but Black could also consider sealing White in with Black 40 or Black ‘f’.


Black 43. Better to reinforce below with 1 in Dia. 1. If White 2, the moves to 15 follow, then –

Dia. 2. Both sides live up to 7. Black then plays ‘a’ in the figure and White plays ‘g’. Black has the cutting point below 6 to worry about, so this would be a good game.


White 44 is the only move. If White pushes down at 1 in Dia. 3, he has to move out clumsily, giving Black the initiative. White 44 is the vital



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

point for both sides. Black has no choice but to fight with 45 and 47.




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 53. Kobayashi: 'This is painful for Black, but I think that it is worth a move. After the game, Black 1 in Dia. 4 was suggested, but then White 2 etc. is hard on Black. White turns the bottom left corner into territory. White 'a' is sente, forcing Black 'b'; White also has the aji of attacking at 'c', so this result looks unpleasant for Black.'


White 56, 58. White is going all out, trying to sink his teeth into Black. When he links up with 62, his strategy has been a success. Black could consider playing 61 at 63, then attacking at 'a'. This would lead to a decisive fight when White counterattacks at 'b'. White would not be afraid.

Black 65. White is grateful, as Black loses the aji of 'c'. Black's gain is that he can now link up with 'd' at any time.


Black 75. Very aggressive — Kobayashi expected 'e'.

White 76 is perfectly timed: it is the prerequisite for extending at 78. If Black plays 79 at 1 in Dia. 5, the presence of the marked white stone enables White to answer at 2. If next Black 3, White can extricate himself with 4 to 10, giving Black a bad result. If White plays the marked white stone after Black 3 here, Black answers with 'a', White connects (at the marked black stone), Black plays 'b', so White is surrounded.


White 88. Another well-timed move: Ko-




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

bayashi is in fine form. If Black resists with 1 in Dia. 6, he exposes his bottom group to danger. Note that 88 also sets up a ladder for White 96.

White 98. If White tries to capture the black group with 1 in Dia. 7, he loses the capturing race

after 12. After White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'a', each side has three liberties, but White can't atari to the right of 1. This diagram makes it clear why Black exchanged 95 for 96.

Black 99. Giving up the centre stones seems best. If Black saves them with 'f', then White will attack the whole group with 'g', Black 'h', White 'i'.






Figure 3 (101 - 150)



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

White 2. White seems to be a little ahead now.


Black 3. The correct way to attack the corner is shown in Dia. 8. If White wins the ko, he only captures at 'a', so Black suffers no damage. After 3 and 4 in the figure, however, he has to fight the ko in Dia. 9. If White wins it and captures at 'a', Black's side position is affected.

White 6. Kobayashi couldn't see any really good move for attacking the four black stones in the centre, so he decided to eliminate the ko.


White 18. White 'a' is also possible, but after forcing with 'b', Black would secure a large area with 'c'.

White 42, 44. The first moves Kobayashi regretted in this game. He hallucinated that without them the group would die, but Dia. 10 shows that it is safe. He should have played 42 at

'd', forcing Black 45, then continued with 'e'. That would have put White ahead on the board, whereas after 44 Black almost catches up.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11




Figure 4 (151 - 208)

Figure 4 (151 - 208)

White 68 is not necessary (if Black 'a', White 'b'), so White should cut at 78. Kobayashi thought that the game might have been closer if Black had played 1 to 5 in Dia. 11 before connecting at 77.

If the game were played right out, White would win by about 2½ points. That was good enough for Otake, who decided to call it a day. If you count the last four games of the 1984 Meijin title, he was in the unwonted position of having lost seven games straight in title matches. Fortunately, he got out of his slump in the Gosei title.


Having won two Judan titles now, to add to his earlier Tengen title, Kobayashi was strengthening his foothold in the ranks of the title-holders. Success was worth waiting for.

Black resigns after White 208.

(*'Kido'*, June 1985. Translated by John Power.)

The Three Virtues of Go

by Donald L. Potter



Li: propriety



Chih: wisdom



Jen: human-heartedness

Li, chih, jen: the three virtues of go. One often sees these three characters written with broad, heavy brush strokes on silk scrolls hanging in go clubs throughout China and Japan. They are taken from the five Confucian virtues: *jen* 'human-heartedness,' *i* 義 'righteousness,' *li* 'propriety,' *chih* 'wisdom,' and *hsin* 信 'sincerity.'

In Chinese numerology the number five was thought to be most 'harmonious,' harmony being a frequent, recurring theme in much of Chinese thought. There are five key points on the go board. The five constant virtues correspond to the five elements: wood, fire, earth, metal, and water, which in turn harmonize with the five planets: Jupiter, Mars, Saturn, Venus, and Mercury.

These three virtues were first applied to go during the reign of Sung T'ai-tsung (976–998), who was passionately fond of the game. The first character, *li*, occupies an august, noble position in East Asian thought. Something can be discovered about the fundamental meaning of the character by examining its component parts. If one passes a vertical line through the middle of the character, two distinct segments, *shih* (1) and *li* (2), appear. The right-hand side, *shih*, which means 'spirit' or 'ghost', imparts meaning and is called the 'signific' or 'radical,' while *li*, strictly speaking, is the 'phonetic' and confers pronunciation. So we have a word pronounced 'li' that has something to do with spirits—in this case, sacrifices to spirits or the ceremonies and the proper rules associated with those sacrifices. Most *kanji* (the Japanese name for Chinese characters) are of this type of formation and are called 'phonetic combinations.'

Originally, some six thousand years ago, Chinese pictographs were elemental representations of physical objects. *Mu* (3) was a picture of a tree with branches and roots, *shan* (4) a

picture of a mountain, *tzu* (5) a baby, *jen* (6) represented a man. A sharp stylus was used to etch the pictures on pottery, bones or shells. As writing brushes became more common during the Shang dynasty (1554 – 1046 B.C.) and especially during the Chou period (1045 – 256 B.C.), the pictographs were simplified and conventionalized. Tree became 木, man 人, baby 子, mountain 山. Another group of characters, to which *li* partly belongs, is the ideograph—a depiction of an idea rather than a concrete object. An example is the character for 'love', *hao* (7)—a picture of a mother and her child, conveying the idea of 'love.'

The ancient ideograph *wei* (8) pictured an enclosed place 囗 with a foot (presumably a foot soldier) on either side, suggesting the idea of 'surround', 'guard', 'protect.' The modern form *wei* 韋 means 'to surround' or 'to protect,' but has become a 'phonetic' in, for example, the character *wei* 圍 (to surround) used in the Chinese expression for go—*wei-ch'i* 圍碁 (spelt 'weiqi' in Pinyin, pronounced 'igo' in Japanese).

The Chinese were making use of phonetic elements in their writing system at least as early as the beginning of the Shang, say 1500 B.C. Since the language abounds in homophones (cf. English *sough*, *sow*), it seemed reasonable to adopt or borrow characters depicting concrete objects which had the same pronunciation to represent abstract concepts. For example, the idea of 'coming', which is difficult to represent pictographically, borrowed the character *lai*, which, while having the same pronunciation, actually meant 'millet.' Today *lai* only means 'to come.' *Wan*, meaning 'ten thousand,' 'many' or 'all', equally difficult to picture, borrowed the character *wan*, which meant 'scorpion.' In very little time the borrowing became appropriation. No one since the Chou period has associated 'wan' with its arachnoid origin.

By far the most common type of *kanji* is a



combination of a phonetic element with an ideograph called a radical, signific or determinative. The 'wei' of 'wei-ch'i' 圍 基 has the phonetic element inside and the enclosure element or determinative on the outside. (One of the convoluted ironies of Chinese: the original element was a picture of a foot on either side of an enclosure and meant 'to guard,' 'to surround.' In order to emphasize its meaning of 'surround,' another enclosure radical 口 was added to it, 'wei' becoming the phonetic. Radicals were added to characters to emphasize meaning, phonetics to suggest pronunciation.)

The formation of the character *li* is, in principle, not unlike that of *wei* 圍. According to the earliest Chinese dictionary, the *Shuo Wen* (compiled by Hsu Shen, d. 120 A.D), the phonetic part, *li* 豐, is in fact a sacrificial vessel, or a stand with a vessel on top filled with an offering of meat. Later the spirit radical was added to clarify further that *li* means sacrifices to the spirits and ancestors and the ceremonies associated with the sacrifices.

Li comes first in this set of three virtues not only because of its special importance to the Japanese but because of its religious and historical significance to the ancient Chinese. Of the numerous philosophical and historical works in early China, thirteen are designated as classics. Of these, three deal with *li*: the *Li Chi* (Records of Propriety), the *I Li* (Book of Etiquette and Ceremonies), and the *Chou Li* (ceremonies of Chou). It is as if we in the West included along with the Bible, Homer, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, the works of Emily Post and Amy Vanderbilt, and the syndicated columns of Judith Martin. Are there any occidental classics that deal solely with propriety?

Of the thirteen classics mentioned, five, *The Book of History*, *The Odes*, *The Book of Changes*, *The Spring and Autumn Annals*, and *The Records of Propriety*, form the core. The *Li Chi* (Records of Propriety) was first translated by a French scholar, J.M. Calley. Among his numerous renditions of *li* a few are: Rite, Cérémonial, L'éti-

quette, Politesse, Courtoisie, Honneteté, Bonnes manières, Dignité personnelle, Moralité de conduite, and many, many others.

Although 'propriety,' 'etiquette,' and the modern English expression 'good form' are consonant with the meaning often expressed in the *Li Chi*, in ancient China *li* had a moral and religious significance immanent in all usages. A life ordered in harmony with it would realize the highest ideal.

The *Li Chi* begins:

'Always in everything let there be reverence; with deportment grave as when one is thinking (deeply), and with speech composed and definite. This will make the people tranquil.'

'Pride should not be allowed to grow; the desires should not be indulged; the will should not be gratified to the full; pleasure should not be carried to excess.'

'Propriety is seen in humbling one's self and giving honour to others. Even porters and peddlers are sure to display this giving honour, how much more should the rich and noble do so.' (Legge)

Propriety distinguishes men from brutes. Courtesy, the consideration of the feeling of others, distinguishes gentlemen from the rabble.

Confucius said, 'It is by the *Odes* that the mind is aroused; by *The Record of Propriety* that the character is established; from Music that the finish is received.' (Legge, *Lun Yü*, Bk. VIII, 8)

Without genuine warmth, kindness and consideration of the feelings of others, propriety loses its spirit. Confucius also warned: 'Without the rules of propriety, respectfulness becomes laborious bustle; carefulness, timidity; boldness, insubordination; and straightforwardness, rudeness.' (Book VIII, 2)

The second kanji or character, *chih* 智, is as difficult of interpretation as it is of practice. In contemporary usage it means 'wisdom,' 'intelligence.' The compound *chih-hui* 智慧 means I.Q.; *chih-li* 智力 means 'intellectual power.'

The phonetic portion of *chih* 智 is *chih* 知; in ancient times the two were used interchangeably to mean 'wisdom' or 'knowledge.' There is, however, once again an inherent ethical force in the classical usage. According to Mencius (372 — 289 B.C.), the four primary moral constituents of human nature are *jen* (human-heartedness), *i* (righteousness), *li* (propriety), and *chih* (wisdom).

Wisdom is the innate knowledge of what is right and wrong. Confucius remarked, '*Chih che pu huo*' 知者不惑 'The wise are free from perplexities.' That is, they know the difference between right and wrong without needing to reflect.

A seventy-year-old professional go teacher explained his idea: 'Go is a gentleman's exercise for the cultivation of the mind. Without employing our minds in thinking about our moves we are offending against one of the four ethical principles as set forth by Mencius. Furthermore, to consider one's move expresses modesty; suggests the strategy of the opponent merits consideration.' (Our inner nature seldom admits this.)

The kanji *jen* 仁 (*jin* in Japanese) has nearly as rich a philosophical interpretation as 'li.' Ideographically, the left hand signific represents a man; the right is the character *erh* 二 meaning 'two.' It is not a phonetic. It represents man and his moral relationship to others.

The great nineteenth century Scottish sinologue James Legge always rendered *jen* as 'benevolence.' In contemporary Chinese the compound *ren-ai* 仁愛 is very common and is most usually rendered as 'love' (Greek 'agape'). Many contemporary scholars use the word 'human-heartedness' as an equivalent. 'Compassion, goodwill, humanity, kindness, mercy' are all close.

Mencius said: 'The feeling of commiseration is the principle of benevolence (*jen*). The feeling of shame (for one's own want of goodness) is the principle of righteousness (*i*). The feeling of modesty and complaisance is the principle of propriety (*li*). The feeling of approving and disapproving is the principle of knowledge (*chih*).' (*Works of Mencius*, Legge, Tr., Dover ed., p. 203)

As mentioned at the beginning of this essay, one finds the three characters for the three virtues of go displayed in go clubs throughout the Orient, but of the three — propriety, intelligence, and kindness — it is 'propriety' that has been held in the greatest veneration. Perhaps more than anything else, this explains the spirit of dignity and consideration that guides participants in what is a competitive game.

(Note: The Wade-Giles Romanization system has been used in this essay.)



Some Poems of Po Lien-yi

Po Lien-yi (ca. 1043–1129) lived during one of the numerous periods in Chinese history of widespread political disintegration. Little is known of his life except that he received his chin-shih (baccalaureate) at the early age of twenty in 1063. During the reign of Sung Che-tsung (1086–1100) he apparently published a description of Chou bronzes, but it is no longer extant.

He seems to have served a short time in the capital, K'ai-feng, before retiring to the south, probably around 1095. A number of his poems that have survived deal with go and are an unusual mixture of rusticity and humour.

(Translated by Donald Potter).

My wife passed away in *wu-yin* (1099).
My only son stays in K'ai-feng.
I came to this rustic villa in *keng-wei* (1104).
Every morning a village boy brings our daily vegetables and bean curd.
Two years ago I gave him a go board.
Now he gives me three stones.


A strong champion visits my mountain villa.
The summer moon is brighter than my oil lamp.
The champion's moves are intelligent and incisive.
But how can I think?
A mosquito is biting my nether leg.

Lying on my woven pallet of fresh straw,
I listen to the gentle cooing of the morning turtledove.
Through my window I watch streaks of grey cloud break the night sky.
I turn and try again to sleep.
How could I have missed that eye-stealing tesuji?


The scent of afternoon cedar wafts through our open window.
The go bowls are made of sandalwood,
The stones of Chiang-nan shell have yellowed with time.
My opponent is amiable but I never get to white.
What is preferment in K'ai-feng compared to these?

Three Trick Moves


Abe 8-dan



1. How should Black counter if White plays the taisha of 3 against a star-point stone?



2. The crosscut of 1 and 3 is a standard device for settling a group under attack. White 5 is a trick move, however. What is Black to do?




3. The moves to 10 are standard, but 11 is a bluff. How does Black set up a winning game?

Answers on page 51.


Basic Fighting Techniques

Miyazawa Goro 7-dan

The three problems below all involve the same elementary tesuji. Anyone of mid-kyu strength should be able to solve them, while dan-level players should get them on sight. If you have any trouble, then this article may be what you need to bring your technique up to scratch.




1. Black to play (3-kyu)



2. Black to play (5-kyu)

Answers on page 52.




3. White to play (1-kyu)

Problem: How to Attack

In the diagram on the right, White wants to attack the two black stones at the top, but his own group does not have secure eye shape. White's main asset is the aji of his four captured stones on the side. The problem is how best to use this aji.

Answer on page 54.




White to play

(Composed by Nakamura Hidehito 8-dan)


Tesuji Magic

Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan


The tesuji problems below require a leap of the imagination to solve, but they should be within the reach of kyu-level players who are prepared to put their minds to solving them. If the obvious move doesn't work, try changing the timing.



1. Black to play. Can he save his group?




2. Black to play. The black group in the corner seems to be beyond hope, but don't give up too soon.




4. Black to play. Funny things happen in the corner. The right tesuji will get them started.

Answers on page 55.



3. White to play. Black's shape in the corner doesn't look very healthy.



5. Black to play. If Black takes a really good look at this position, White will be in bad trouble.

Voice Recorder 361

Konishi Taizo 6-dan

Kobayashi Kenji's hit

On the last Thursday in November (1984), the semifinals of the 9th Kisei tournament were being played. The pairings were Otake v. Kobayashi

Koichi and Takemiya v. Kataoka. The game being transmitted on the internal TV system at the Nihon Ki-in was the one between Otake and Kobayashi, which was being played in the Yugen


playing room, so most of the attention was being concentrated on it.

On the 6th floor Sakai Takeshi 9-dan and Kobayashi Reiko 6-dan (Koichi's wife) were at the centre of a large group of young professionals. Kobayashi had seemed to be way ahead, but he had made some slips and the game seemed to be close. His wife Reiko couldn't hide her anxiety.


In the pressroom on the 5th floor, two groups — Rin Kaiho Honinbo and Yamabe 9-dan, and Abe 8-dan and Nakamura Hidehito 8-dan — were absorbed in studying the yose.

On the 6th floor Kobayashi Kenji commented: 'When White plays 1 (in Dia. 1), I'd like to attach at 2.'

'That's looks like a swindle,' someone said.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

8: connects

At first sight, the move does look ridiculous, but when you look closely you realize that it's quite a tesuji.

Before long, the TV monitor showed Kobayashi's hand reaching out and attaching at 2. Otake immediately backed up at 3.

Rin: 'Two points profit at this stage of the game is big. The contact play is an "ear-reddening" tesuji.'

It had all been worked out on the 6th floor, but on the 5th floor no one had seen it coming. The man who had scored the bull's eye, Kobayashi Kenji, pretended to sulk. 'Rin calls it an "ear-reddening" tesuji, but when I suggest it, it's called a swindle.'

Dia. 2. If White resists with 2, he's neatly caught in a trap with 3 to 9.

The birth of Fukui Masaaki 8-dan


Recently some professionals have taken to referring to their promotions by the years of the Olympics. For example: 'It's my first promotion since Munich.' 'It's my first since Mexico.'

Fukui Masaaki had been comfortably ensconced as a 7-dan for many years but has now moved up to 8-dan. He must have seen three Olympics as a 7-dan.

His promotion game was with his good friend Su Kaiseki 5-dan. The world of go is a small one. The more intimate friends you are, the more seriously you fight when you meet across the go board, according to go etiquette. Su 5-dan must have been fired up for his first encounter with Fukui in some time, but unfortunately he had to go into hospital with acute pancreatitis. Fukui became 8-dan on a win by forfeit.

Fukui is known for the great breadth and depth of his knowledge about go. Give him ten moves of any game and he'll tell you who played it — that's how much he's studied. Fujisawa Shuko thinks highly of his talent.

He also has a unique go style. White 1 in Dia. 1, from a game against Kobayashi Koichi, will give you some idea of it.




Dia. 1

The usual extension of 1 in Dia. 2 leaves White fleeing aimlessly into the centre, while Black 2 makes the marked stone a bad move. Fukui was hoping for the result in Dia. 3. White gets abundant eye shape and can aim at the exposed sides of the black positions above and below. He was enraptured at the prospect. Kobayashi actually answered 1 in Dia. 1 with 'a'. The result was a win for Black.


Fukui has mixed feelings about his promotion. 'I always thought that I would mature late, but I don't know whether to be happy or sad about reaching 8-dan at this age.'

I would have liked to present his promotion game, but with it being a forfeit . . .

('Kido', January 1985)



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

(Note: Fukui was born 15 January 1944. He reached 8-dan on 2 November 1984.)


Three Trick Moves: Answers Continued from page 48

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. One's instinctive reaction is to split White with 1, but that lets him dodge the attack with 2 and 4. This way the exchange of the marked stone for Black 1 is good for White.



Dia. 1: bad




Dia. 2: trouble


Dia. 2. Black 1 lets White cut with 2 and 4. He will welcome this fight.

Dia. 3. Attaching at 1 is the right counter. If White 2, Black keeps the white stones separated with 3 and 5. The marked white stone is now peeping at a bamboo joint.

Dia. 4. Black may be worried about the wedge (warikomi) at 2, but he has nothing to fear so long as he keeps the enemy forces split. After he




Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4

connects at 5 —

Dia. 5. The best White can do is to attack with 1 and 3, but then Black makes good shape with 4 and 6. Next, 'a' and 'b' are miai. White will also have trouble looking after the two floating stones in the centre.



Dia. 5




Dia. 1: wrong


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Attempting to capture White with 1 and 3 won't work because of White's cut at 6. One assumes that White wouldn't play this trick move if the ladder were not favourable for him.


Dia. 2. Black can, of course, easily live in the corner with 1 to 7 but at the cost of giving up the two stones on the outside. This is a wretched




Dia. 2: terrible



Dia. 3: correct



Dia. 4: good for Black



Dia. 5: ko

result.

Dia. 3. Black has to look after the stones on the outside as well, and the way to do that is with 1 to 7. The key move is Black 7. Next —

Dia. 4. If White 1, Black 2 is sente, so Black has time to secure the corner with 4. If then White 5, Black moves out with 6. This keeps White split into two eyeless groups and ensures that Black will keep the initiative.


Dia. 5. Playing 4 in Dia. 4 at 1 here is an overplay. White can get a ko in the corner with 4 to 8.

Answer to Problem 3


Dia. 1. Black 1 is obviously the only move. The problem is what comes next. The atari at 3 is bad: White will welcome the fight that follows here. Black has failed to punish him for his arrogance.

Dia. 2. Black 3 is better. Black gets safe positions with 3 to 7, but then so does White. This result is not satisfactory.


Dia. 3. The strongest counter is the 3—5 combination. Black's position seems to be full of holes, but —




Dia. 1: failure




Dia. 2: not enough



Dia. 3: strongest



*Dia. 4: a won game
7: connects*



Dia. 5

Dia. 4. If White is foolish enough to push up at 1, Black gets an excellent squeeze with 2 to 6. After making White heavy, Black secures his other group with 8. The game is now unlosable.


Dia. 5. If White 1, Black squeezes from above. White can capture two stones with 3, but Black builds enormous thickness up to 8.

(*'Let's Go'*, March 1984)


Basic Fighting Techniques: Answers Continued from page 48

Pattern 23: Connecting along the Edge


The tesuji for connecting along the edge is called *watari* in Japanese. Needless to say, in this article we are concerned with the kind of *watari* that is not apparent at first sight. For example, in Dia. 1 Black can save his group with the right



Dia. 1




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

move, but it is not 1 in Dia. 2. After White 2 and 4, Black cannot live in the corner. The tesuji is Black 1 in Dia. 3: White can do nothing to keep him from linking up to the outside stones. (Actually, Black 1 at 'a' also serves the purpose.)




Problem 1: Black to play


Black has gone all-out to kill White, but how is he to deal with the white cutting stone? He has to get around the fact that White 'a' is sente.

Dia. 1. Black 1 is hopeless. Black 3 is forced after 2, so White captures him with 4. Black 1 at 'a' also fails because of White 2, Black 3, White 'b'.


Dia. 2. The kosumi at 1 is the tesuji.




Dia. 1: failure



Dia. 2: the tesuji



Dia. 3: connected




Dia. 4: White is dead


Dia. 3. The point is that when White ataris at 1, Black answers at 2. If then White 3 —

Dia. 4. He recaptures at 4, thereby maintaining his connection and also preventing White from getting a second eye. Black suffers a superficial injury but deals White a mortal blow.

Dia. 5. Exchanging 1 for 2 makes no difference.



Dia. 5




Problem 2: Black to play


The problem is to save the marked black stones. It looks hopeless, but there's a famous tesuji.

Dia. 1. Black 1 is indeed hopeless.


Dia. 2. Black 1 is the famous 'nose contact play'. This exploits White's shortage of liberties.




Dia. 1: useless



Dia. 2: the tesuji



Dia. 3: connected




Dia. 4


Dia. 3. Resisting leads nowhere, as White cannot increase his liberties.

Dia. 4. White 5 and 7 are the strongest moves, but then White cannot delay securing his capture of the two black stones any longer. After 11 —

Dia. 5. Black 12 secures the connection. White can't connect at 'a'. Black 12 at 'b' would, of course, be a bad mistake.



Dia. 5




Problem 3: White to play


This is the most difficult problem — White has to display a bit of technique and careful timing to save his three stones.

Dia. 1. With 1 and 3, White obviously hopes to link up with a squeeze, but Black 4 puts paid to his plans. Starting with 1 is the mistake.


Dia. 2. Making the hane at 1 first is essential.




Dia. 1: wrong timing




Dia. 2: the tesuji



Dia. 3: connected



Dia. 4



Dia. 5: unavailing

The reason —


Dia. 3. Black has no choice but to answer at 1 (instead of 4 in Dia. 1), so now White can get his squeeze with 2 and 4.

Dia. 4. White 6 and 8 complete the job.


Dia. 5. Countering with 1 instead of 1 in Dia. 3 does not work.

(‘Gekkan Go’, November 1979)

How to Attack: Answer Continued from page 48



Dia. 1: inferior



Dia. 2: correct


Dia. 1. Being satisfied with the forcing moves of 1 and 3 shows a lack of severity. White has not made the maximum use of the aji of his captured stones. His group still has poor eye shape.

The kosumi at ‘a’ is better but still unsatisfactory when Black answers at 2.


Dia. 2. White 1, aiming at the cut at ‘a’, is the best move.

Dia. 3. Defending his weakness with 2 is advisable for Black. White then achieves his objective with the hane of 3.


Dia. 4. If Black is foolish enough to counter with 1, he falls into a trap. White saves his captured stones with 2 to 6.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (analogy). By analogy with the previous problem, it is clear that White ‘a’ here would be a mistake. It may be sente, but it has no effect on the black stones to the left. The tesuji is White 1; Black can’t resist because White is aiming at blocking at ‘b’.


(‘Kido’, December 1984)

Tesuji Magic Answers Continued from page 49


Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Giving atari at 1 just helps White to repair the defect in his shape.


Dia. 2. Cutting at 1 also gives White an easy answer at 2. This time White can even tenuki when Black plays 'a'.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: wrong



Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4

Dia. 3. Black must start out with the throw-in at 1. White must answer at 2, so then Black ataris at 3. White is forced to play a ko with 4. This is the correct answer. Instead of 4 –

Dia. 4. If White connects at 2, he loses outright as he cannot atari after 3.

Answer to Problem 2


Dia. 1. Blocking at 1 is much too slow. Black 'a' after 2 does not get a ko, as White simply ataris at 'b'.




Dia. 1: too slow

Dia. 2. Black 1 is more resourceful. White has to play 2 (he gets into a terrible ko if he ataris at 4 immediately), so Black can set up a ko with 3 and 5. This is the correct answer.


Dia. 3. Once the ko fight starts, White has time to capture at 1 after Black recaptures the ko with the marked stone. After Black 2, the ko continues.




Dia. 2: correct



Dia. 3



Dia. 4: wrong for White



Dia. 5: wrong


If other words, White gets one ko threat here with 1.

Dia. 4. This is the 'terrible ko' referred to above. White must minimize his potential losses by following Dia. 2.

Dia. 5. Starting with the hane of 1 is a mistake. White saves everything by taking the vital point of 2.

Answer to Problem 3 (next page)

Dia. 1. At first sight, the corner seems safe.




Dia. 1: alive

If White ataris at 1, Black secures his eye shape with 2. There is no way to reduce him to one eye.


Dia. 2. The throw-in at 1 doesn't work either. Black has time to connect in answer to 3, so there's not even a ko.

Dia. 3. The worst move is giving atari on the inside with 1 — worst because it gives Black the most points in the corner. However, Dias. 1 and 3 have at least indicated where the vital point is.

Dia. 4. White takes the vital point with 1. There is now no way that Black can stop him from getting a ko.



*Dia. 2: alive
4: connects*



Dia. 9: dead

ko. Instead of 4 —


Dia. 8. Black 2 is another attempt to parry the attack, but if White plays 3 he can now kill Black outright.

Dia. 9. Likewise, answering 1 at 2 leads to the death of the group. Black must play the ko.


Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. The first move most people will think of is pushing down at 1, but this does not work. Black cannot atari after 4. Instead of 3 —


Dia. 2. The throw-in at 1 makes no difference. He still can't atari.




Dia. 3: worst




Dia. 4: the vital point



Dia. 5: ko




Dia. 6: ko



Dia. 7: ko

6: connects




Dia. 8: dead


Dia. 5. If Black blocks at 2, White easily gets a ko with 3 and 5.

Dia. 6. If Black 2, White again forces a ko with 3 and 5. If next Black 'a', White plays 'b'.


Dia. 7. Black 2 is a tricky move, but White counters with a throw-in at 3, again leading to a




Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: wrong



Dia. 3: two vital points



Dia. 4: ko



Dia. 5: dead

Dia. 3. If descending to the second line does not work, the only move left is Black 1. White blocks at 2, whereupon Black 3 becomes the vital


Continued on page 64.




The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan


How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. White has just played a pincer (triangled stone) in the lower right corner, and three proposals are being made for Black's next move. Which one do you think fits the fuseki best?



Dia. A



Dia. B



Dia. C

A: I like to play solidly, so the kosumi at 1 seems like a good move to me. Not only does it lead to few variations, it's also the best move for getting a firm base in the corner.


B: I can't believe anyone would play the kosumi in this position. Black should settle the position with a pincer of his own. How about the two-space pincer at 1?

C: I agree with B's approach, but I wouldn't pick the same pincer. The one-space pincer at 1 is better. I wonder if B understands the difference of one line.

Fuseki Analysis

Since josekis work effectively in a certain direction, it is necessary to examine the positions along the adjacent sides and in the adjacent corners when choosing a joseki for a particular opening. Positions in the opposite corner are usually only a factor when a ladder is involved. In this issue's fuseki (fuseki diagram, next page), the position in the upper right will determine the choice of joseki.

The triangled black stone in the upper right




Fuseki Diagram

corner is the key to understanding the fuseki. Because it is on the fourth line, Black wants to be sure to extend in the direction of 'a' to complete his development before White has a chance to play on the right.

At the bottom, Black cannot hope to expand much because of the position of the two circled white stones. If he could engineer a splitting attack against these stones and the triangled white stone, then his prospects would be good, but it is far from certain that he will be able to do this.

Black's strategy therefore is to get some kind of sabaki in the lower right corner so that he can take sente to play on the right.



Dia. 1


C Wins the Debate

The correct move for this fuseki is the one-space pincer at 1 in Dia. C. Before seeing why, we will take a look at the joseki in isolation.


The purpose of Black 1 in Dia. 2 is to force the marked white stone into action so that Black can settle the marked black stone. Since the important stone is the marked one, Black must be prepared to treat 1 lightly.

White usually answers with the attachment at 2. Other possibilities, which indicate a special strategy, are 'a', 'b', and 'c'.

After White attaches, Black hanes at 3 in Dia. 3, then extends at 5 after White 4. White ordinarily makes a bamboo joint at 6, although blocking at 'a' is also possible (see Dia. 9).




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Black must next make a base in the corner with 7 in Dia. 4. If White plays the thick move at 8, Black reduces the influence of White's thickness with a move around 9. Since Black plays both in the corner and on the side, there is a slight feeling of greediness about this joseki.




Dia. 4

Black's follow-up move is the slide to 'a'. If White is able to play first, he cuts at 1 in Dia. 5. After the sequence to 7, he can aim at the two-step hane in Dia. 6, which results in a ko.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

White must be careful with the timing, since it may not be a one-sided ko in his favor.




Dia. 7




Dia. 8

An alternative for 8 in Dia. 4 is White 1 or 'a' in Dia. 7. Black pushes up at 2 and White jumps to 3. After 4 and 5 in Dia. 8, Black attacks at 6, driving the marked white stone into the center. Although White has taken the initiative on the right, his stone at the bottom has become very weak. Whether this variation or the basic joseki is better is impossible to say, but from the standpoint of the flow of the moves, the basic joseki is more natural.




Dia. 9




Dia. 10

White also has the option of switching 6 in Dia. 3 to the blocking move at 1 in Dia. 9. Black pushes through and cuts with 2 and 4 in Dia. 10, and White cuts at 5. When Black hane and connects in Dia. 11, White descends at 9, making a ko inevitable. The only move for Black is the attachment at 10. (He must not hane at 'a', as will be explained later.)


The ko comes about in the sequence to 14 in Dia. 12. White takes first with 15 and Black




Dia. 11



Dia. 12




Dia. 13




Dia. 14

retakes with 18 in Dia. 13 after playing the ko threat at 16. Each side has one more ko threat, White at 19 in Dia. 14 and Black at 22. Since White has no more ko threats when Black captures at 24 in Dia. 15, he turns at 25 and captures the three stones on the outside when Black ends the ko with 26. The resulting division of profit and thickness is even.




Dia. 15




Dia. 16

If White needs sente, he can switch 19 in Dia. 14 to 1 in Dia. 16 and capture two stones immediately (if Black 'a', White gets a geta with 'b'). Black will then capture at 2. The price White pays for taking sente is reduced thickness.



Dia. 17




Dia. 18

Earlier it was pointed out that the hane in Dia. 17 (instead of 10 in Dia. 11) was a bad move. The reason is that it lets White descend at 2. After the sequence to 6, Black has no choice but to throw in at 7 in Dia. 18 (any other move loses outright), but when White captures, Black has no threats to fight the ko with.

This concludes our study of the joseki in isolation. What happens when it is played out in this issue's fuseki?


Dia. 19 (next page) shows the main variation.




Dia. 19

Up to 9 Black not only has settled his stones in the corner, he has also taken the point he wanted on the side. This is an ideal result. If White continues with 'a', Black will slide to 'b'. If White cuts at 'c' instead, Black will atari at 'd' and follow the continuation in Dia. 5, then jump out to 'a'. Whichever course White chooses, Black is satisfied.

Instead of Dia. 19, White might consider playing first on the right with 1 in Dia. 20, but after the continuation to Black 6 he will find it hard to move out with 'a'. If he does jump to 'a', Black will keep up the pursuit with 'b' and launch a double attack against the stones on the right and the left. If White tries to connect at



Dia. 20




Dia. 21


'c' after 'b', Black can either attack on a large scale from above at 'd' or wait for a chance to cut on the right with a kosumi at 'e'.

Is there any difference if White extends one line further to 1 in Dia. 21? If Black follows the same sequence as in Dia. 20, then White will have scored a success: the added strength of 3 and 5 makes 1 an ideal extension and the move at 'a', if Black plays 6, is severe. Its severity becomes clear in the sequence in Dia. 22 where, unable to put up any strong resistance after White 3, Black is left with an unsteady group while White has taken a large profit in the corner.


Since Dia. 21 is unacceptable for Black, he must fight back. After the forcing move at 2 in Dia. 23, he must counterattack at 4. When White




Dia. 22



Dia. 23



Dia. 25



Dia. 24

jumps to 5, he pushes up with 6 and 8, then jumps to 10, sealing White in. This will be a very tough fight for White.

One last possibility for White is to butt into Black 1 in Dia. 24 with 2. Although White takes the corner with 4 and 6, Black is quite happy with the strong position he gets on the right. Taking sente, he can attack the two white stones on the left while moving into the bottom area. White 'a' and White 3 instead of 2 produce a similar result.


If White tries one of the variations stemming from Dia. 9, his best bet is Dia. 16, which gives him sente. The result is shown in Dia. 25, where Black has just played the marked stone (Black 2

in Dia. 16) to capture three white stones. Although White 1 is a good point, Black gets an easy game when he invades at the three-three point after exchanging 2 for 3.


A's Proposal

A proposed the kosumi at 1 in Dia. 26. If White answers at 2, the sequence to 4 forms a basic joseki pattern in which Black achieves his goal of settling himself quickly in the corner. In this fuseki, however, the result is unsatisfactory, because White effortlessly takes the key point on the right side. Nor is White bothered by Black's pincer at 5: he simply jumps to 6.

White can also play the 2 and 4 combination in



Dia. 26




Dia. 27


Dia. 27. White's shape may seem full of holes, but it is resilient, making it difficult for Black to find a good continuation. With 'a' to aim at as well, White has a good game.

B's Proposal

B's idea was to play the two-space pincer in Dia. 28. In one continuation, shown in Dia. 29,




Dia. 28




Dia. 29

Black extends up the side to 3 while White snuffs out the black stone at the bottom. The contrast with the one-space pincer is obvious: the two-space pincer emphasizes Black 1 in Dia. 28 at the expense of the triangled stone.

If Black cannot afford to abandon the triangled stone, he must try to do something with it in the corner. The first move to consider is 3 in Dia. 30, which attempts to create some weaknesses in White's shape. This move only works, however, if Black can capture the white stone with 'a' in the ladder that develops when White ataris from underneath and connects at 6. If he cannot capture the white stone with 'a', then playing in at 3 is out of the question.




Dia. 30




Dia. 31

If the ladder in Dia. 30 favors Black, White of course cannot play 4 and must atari instead from above at 4 in Dia. 31. The diagonal connection at 6 is correct shape when Black connects. Black can then choose 'a', 'b', or 'c' for his next move.





Dia. 32




Dia. 33

If the ladder favors White, as it does in this issue's fuseki, Black must crawl at 3 in Dia. 32. After White connects at 4 and Black crawls again at 5 in Dia. 33, White forces Black down with a two-step hane. When Black captures with 9 and 11, White pincers the triangled black stone with 12 in Dia. 34.






Dia. 36




Dia. 37

attach at 4 when Black extends to 3. Although White gets profit in the corner, his shape in this diagram is inferior to his shape in Dia. 29. (Note that if White switches 4 to 'a', Black can still get life by sliding to 'b'.)



Dia. 38



Dia. 39

If Black plays the two-space pincer in this issue's fuseki, the sequence to Black 5 in Dia. 38 can be expected. Comparing this result to the result in Dia. 19, one easily sees that Black is dissatisfied. Although he has played in the right direction, his play has lacked aggressiveness.

If Black tries to live in the corner by crawling at 3 in Dia. 39 instead of extending, White will get sente to take the good point of 12 (playing atari at 'a' before playing 12 is also good). If Black next escapes with 'b' or 'c', White will welcome the opportunity to seize the initiative.


(*'Gekkan Gogaku'*, October 1981. Translated by David Thayer.)

Endgame Problem

Black to play (problem composed by Inoue Kunio 7-dan).

Black can use the marked stone to take a lot of endgame profit and, in the process, to split White into two groups. What is the tesuji?

Answer on page 64.



Tesuji Magic (continued)

point. If you failed to solve this problem, it was probably because this move was a blindspot. In response —


Dia. 4. The best that White can do is to set up a ko with 1 and 3. Instead of 1 —

Dia. 5. If White tries to improve on a ko, he ends up losing outright when Black cuts at 2.


Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. Black 1 leads nowhere. Black 1 at 2 is no better — White answers at 1.


Dia. 2. Descending at 1 is also useless.




Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: wrong



Dia. 3: wrong




Dia. 4: a clue




Dia. 5: correct timing


Dia. 3. Black 1 also doesn't work. Black doesn't get a ko with 'a' after 2, as, with his spare liberty,




Dia. 6: ko



Dia. 7: best



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

White can atari at 'b'. After 2 —

Dia. 4. Black can try the kosumi of 1, but White calmly captures at 2. If Black 3, he again just captures. The three black stones inside White's group are now helpless. This variation is a failure, but it provides a valuable hint.

Dia. 5. Black must change the timing, beginning with the kosumi of 1. If White 2, Black throws in at 3, then —

Dia. 6. If White 1, Black descends at 2, and now White has to play a ko around the marked stone to try to save his seven stones.

Dia. 7. Instead of 2 in Dia. 5, the best answer for White is 2 here. Black can still get a ko with 3 and 5, but White does not have so much at stake.

Dia. 8. If White 2, White can avoid a ko but at the cost of losing his two corner stones outright.

Dia. 9. White could also avoid the ko by playing 4 in Dia. 8 at 2 here.

(*'Let's Go'*, May 1984)


Answer to Endgame Problem 1 (on page 63)

Dia. 1. Black 1 and 3 take only a trifling profit.


Dia. 2. The correct move is Black 1. If White 'a', Black plays 'b'.

Dia. 3. White 1 is the strongest counter, but Black 2 is even stronger. White 3 is forced, to stop Black from making a throw-in at 3, but then Black links up with 4 and 6.


(*'Kido'*, November 1984)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

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
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